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I. INTRODUCTION
At first men had no kings save the gods, and no government
save theocracy. They reasoned like Caligula, and, at that
period, reasoned aright. It takes a long time for feeling so to
change that men can make up their minds to take their equals
as master, in the hope that they will profit by doing so.'
From the mere fact that gods reigned over every political society, it followed
that there were as many gods as peoples. Two peoples that were strangers, and
almost always enemies, could not long recognize the same master: two armies
in battle could not obey the same leader. National division thus led to
polytheism, and this in turn gave rise to theological and civil intolerance,
which, as we shall see hereafter, are by nature the same.'
Throughout world history the conflict between religious groups has been
one of the major battlegrounds for the social and cultural development of
countries. The crusades in the early Middle Ages, the persecution of the
religious dissenters throughout Europe in the 15th and 16th centuries, and the
persecution of the Jews by the Nazis from 1935-45 are only a few examples
of how fatal and dangerous the consequences are when religion is too closely
related to the government. Because different religions can be hostile toward
each other, even armed conflicts are not rare. For example, the war in
Yugoslavia broke out because of the different religious beliefs of Serbs and
Croatians, followers of the Dalai Lama are persecuted by the Chinese
government, and the French government has held the activities of Scientology
to be criminal acts. In all these cases the government is not neutral toward the
religious group but favors or discriminates against a certain religion. A
religiously neutral government, on the other hand, would decrease the conflicts
between the different religious groups within its country.
Unfortunately this strict neutrality is almost impossible to reach and most
countries that have adopted such a principle still face religious conflicts.
However, these conflicts have shifted from armed conflicts to legal conflicts
and battles of words, which offer at least a more peaceful way to fight. One
major battleground for these religious conflicts is the public school system.
That battleground is the subject of this paper.
1 JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SocIAL CoNTRAcT 298 (G.D.H. Cole trans., Everyman
2d ed. 1998).
2 See id.
3 See Peter Gruber, Religionsfreiheit, FocUs, Dec. 15, 1998, at 246-49.
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My discussion of how religion should be treated in the public school
system will be based on a comparison between Germany and the United States.
While the United States adheres to the principle of strict separation of church
and state, the German Basic Law has connected church and state in some
respects. A comparison of how both countries deal with religious freedom in
public school will thus enable the reader to decide for himself which of the two
systems better balances the religious freedom of the school children and the
proper interests of the state.
Before considering the role of religion in public schools, it is necessary to
provide some basic background about the relationship between religion and
state in both countries. This background will be provided for the United States
in part H and for Germany in part lI.
After offering a brief summary of the school systems in both countries, Part
IV offers a comparative account of United States and German law on three
main issues: (1) prayer in public schools, (2) the use of religious symbols in
public schools, and (3) the free exercise rights of teachers in public schools.
The last part of the paper explores historical, textual, and sociological
reasons that explain the differing approaches to religion in the public school
systems of both countries. It also addresses whether the United States or
Germany has developed a better approach to protecting religious freedom in
public schools.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF
RELIGION IN THE UNITED STATES
A. Overview
1. United States Constitutional Protection of Religion. "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. . . . This short and simple opening passage of the First
Amendment contains the two major principles that guarantee religious
freedom in the United States. The first clause, commonly referred to as the
Establishment Clause, provides freedom from government interference in
religious matters. In contrast, the second clause, referred to as the Free
Exercise Clause, protects the individual's freedom of religious belief and
practice. The First Amendment thus provides dual protections: it guarantees
government neutrality toward religion and the individual's liberty in choosing
and practicing a religion.
" U.S. CONST. amend I.
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Aside from the First Amendment, only article VI of the United States
Constitution directly relates to religion.5 Section 3 of article VI prohibits the
use of religious tests as a requirement for the "Qualification to any Office or
public Trust under the United States."6 On its face, this section applies only to
the federal government. However, if any state attempted to apply such tests
for its public offices, this action would clearly violate the First Amendment.
Requiring religious tests for public offices is therefore unconstitutional for
both federal and state governments.
2. Applicability of the First Amendment to the States. The commands of
the First Amendment are directed exclusively to the United States Congress.
Therefore, one might assume that only the federal government is bound by
them. Indeed, for a long time, judicial protection under the First Amendment
was only applied to actions of the national government. The United States
Supreme Court and lower federal courts simply rejected cases in which actions
by state governments were challenged on the basis that they violated the First
Amendment.!
Beginning in 1925 with Gitlow v. New York, however, the Supreme Court
applied First Amendment protections of freedom of speech and press to the
states based on the incorporation of those freedoms into the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 9 Two years earlier, in Meyer v.
Nebraska, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment protected the
freedom of a person "to worship God according to the dictates of his own
conscience."' In 1940 the Court explicitly stated that the Free Exercise Clause
of the First Amendment applied to the states," and seven years later, the Court
s For the purpose of this paper, this provision is not relevant. As a result, I will refrain from
further analysis of article VI. For a more extensive analysis of article VI of the United States
Constitution, see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-2, at 1155 n. I (2d
ed. 1988).
6 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 3.
7 SeeTorcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (invalidating astate constitutional provision
requiring the declaration of a belief in God as a qualification for public office).
8 See ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON & WILLIAM M. BEANEY, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: INTRODUCTORY ESSAYS AND SELECTED CASES 516 (6th ed. 1978) ("The Justices were not
yet willing to become censors of state legislation.").
9 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (holding that freedom of speech and
freedom of the press are fundamental rights protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
'0 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,399 (1923). See generally Walz v. Tax Commission,
397 U.S. 664, 701-03 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (providing a detailed description of the
incorporation process).
" See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (invalidating a state statute that
required a permit for charitable or religious solicitation).
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explicitly incorporated the Establishment Clause into the Fourteenth
Amendment.1
2
In all of the following decisions, the Court regularly applied the two First
Amendment clauses to the states. Today, it is established that the states are
bound by the religious guarantees of the First Amendmentjust like the national
government. 
3
B. The Establishment Clause
One of the most difficult issues to resolve with respect to the Establishment
Clause has been how to define "establishment." The First Amendment states
that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion. .. "
But what kind of law would constitute such an "establishment"? Does the
clause only prohibit the government from establishing a certain religion, or is
it sufficient that the government action favors or discriminates against a
certain religion? What if the government favors or disfavors all religions?
1. What Is "Establishment"? The First Amendment does not define the
non-establishment principle in a detailed manner. Because there are no
"precisely stated constitutional prohibitions" in this area, the Supreme Court
must "draw lines" to define the scope of protection of the Establishment
Clause. 4 The Court has done so in part by relying on historical documents
that tend to reveal the framers' intent in enacting the First Amendment.
Probably the clearest and most extensive historical analysis was under-
taken in Everson v. Board of Education.5 In this case the Court faced the
question of whether a government subsidy for the bus transportation of
parochial school children would constitute an "establishment of religion"
under the First Amendment. In order to define the meaning of "establish-
ment," Justice Black, writing for the majority, analyzed the historical reasons
for enacting the Establishment Clause. Many of the early settlers who came
to the United States had feared or experienced the danger of religious
12 See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) ("There is every reason to give the
same application and broad interpretation to the 'establishment of religion' clause.").
13 See JOHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 17.2, at 1222 (5th
ed. 1995) ("Although the original understanding of the drafters of the First and the Fourteenth
Amendments may be unclear, a majority of the Justices on the Supreme Court during the past
50 years consistently has held that the values protected by the religious clauses are fundamental
aspects of liberty in our society and must be protected from both state and federal interference.")
(footnote omitted).
14 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
"s 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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persecution in Europe. They did not, however, try to avoid these dangers by
separating the church from the state. In the new colonies, the religious sects
maintained "[the] absolute political and religious supremacy" they had in
Europe, and, as a result, religious persecution and the payment of taxes for
church support were present in almost every colony.16 These practices raised
concerns and protests among some "freedom-loving colonials." These protests
finally led to the enactment of the Virginia Bill of Religious Liberties, written
by Thomas Jefferson, that prohibited religious persecution and taxation for
church support.'7 Jefferson relied on James Madison's Memorial and
Remonstrance against the Law, a document criticizing Virginia's tax law,
which allowed the levy of taxes for church support. The Court in Everson
found that because Jefferson and Madison had leading roles in the drafting and
adoption of the Virginia Bill of Religious Liberties as well as the United States
Constitution, the objectives and goals of the two documents must have been
similar or even identical.18 The Court finally concluded that, according to all
three documents, the Establishment Clause should "mean[] at least" that
[n]either a state nor the Federal Government can set up a
church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all
religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can
force nor influence a person to go to or remain away from
church against his will or force him to profess a belief or
disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for
entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for
church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount,
large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities
or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form
they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state
nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, partici-
pate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and
vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against
establishment of religion by law was intended to erect a wall
of separation between church and State.' 9
16 Id. at 8-11.
17 See An Act for Establishing Religious Freedoms of 1785, reprinted in 12 HENING'S
STATUTES ATLARGE 84 (William Waller Hening ed., 1823); see also DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN
HISTORY 125-26 (Henry Steele Commager ed., 8th ed. 1968).
IS Everson, 330 U.S. at 13 (recognizing the consistent objectives of Madison and Jefferson).
'9 Id. at 15-16 (emphasis omitted).
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According to this definition, the Establishment Clause prohibits much more
than the creation of a church or religion by the government. It potentially
prohibits almost every government action that impacts religion. In Everson
itself, however, the Court also said that the non-establishment principle "does
not require the state to be [the] adversary" of religion.20 Instead, the Establish-
ment Clause requires the state to be as neutral as possible toward religion and
religious practices. "State power is no more to be used so as to handicap
religions than it is to favor religion."' This attitude is best described by the
concept of strict separation, which requires the government to be as neutral
as possible in order to maintain the "wall of separation" intended by the
framers of the Constitution. It is important not to confuse this strict separation
with strict neutrality. Under the latter concept, "government would be
forbidden to utilize religion as a standard for action or inaction because the
religious clauses prohibit classification in terms of religion either to confer a
benefit or to impose a burden."' The Supreme Court has never adopted a
policy of strict neutrality, mainly because of its incompatibility with the Free
Exercise Clause.23 For instance, the Free Exercise clause authorizes and
perhaps even mandates certain religious exemptions, but the strict neutrality
principle would prevent the government from granting them.24 Though the
Court has narrowed the opportunity to obtain religious exemptions from
generally applicable laws, it has not totally given up the possibility of religious
exemptions. 2s The Court in Employment Division, Department of Human
Resources v. Smith recognized two areas where there could possibly be a
20 Id. at 18.
21 Id.
' TRIBE, supra note 5, § 14-7, at 1188 (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted).
23 See id. at 1189.
2 See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 82 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("It is difficult
to square any notion of complete neutrality with the mandate of the Free Exercise Clause that
government must sometimes exempt a religious observer from an otherwise generally applicable
obligation.") (emphasis omitted); see also McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 639 (1978)
(Brennan, J., concurring) ("Government may take religion into account when necessary... to
exempt, when possible, from generally applicable governmental regulation individuals whose
religious beliefs and practices would otherwise thereby be infringed .... ). See generally TRIBE,
supra note 5, §14-7, at 1188-89 (providing a more detailed analysis of the concept of strict
neutrality).
' See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)
(upholding the denial of unemployment benefits to a drug counselor who was fired because of
his drug consumption at a religious ceremony).
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constitutionally mandated exception to general laws.26 It also observed: "But
to say that a nondiscriminatory religious-practice exemption is permitted, or
even desirable, is not to say that it is constitutionally required.",2" According
to the Court, the government has the final decision whether or not to grant an
exception. Thus, the holding in Smith does not indicate a shift by the Court
toward strict neutrality.
As we will see, over the years the Court has moved away from the principle
of strict separation toward a more open approach of neutrality and accommo-
dation between church and state. Nonetheless, the Court still frequently refers
to the basic definition of establishment created by the Court in Everson v.
Board of Education.28
2. The Judicial Doctrines Developed in Establishment Clause Cases. The
"wall of separation" constructed in Everson cannot be an absolute one.
Otherwise, government would not even be allowed to provide police or fire
protection to religious institutions, which the Court expressly rejected in
Zorach v. Clauson.2 9 In all Establishment Clause cases, the Court must draw
lines between government actions that constitute an establishment and those
that do not. In performing this task, the Court has established a variety of
doctrines that have shifted over time.30
a. Strict Separation (1947-1970). The doctrine of strict separation was
first applied by the Court in Everson v. Board of Education.3 Everson, a
taxpayer in New Jersey, challenged a state statute that allowed school boards
to subsidize bus transportation of parochial school students.32 The Supreme
Court affirmed the lower court's holding that the statute did not violate the
First Amendment. Even though there had to be a "high and impregnable"33
wall of separation between church and state, the statute did not breach this wall
' Id. at 877 (referring to Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), a case in which the Court
held that government may not regulate "religious belief as such") and id. at 881 (referring to
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), a case that involved not only the Free Exercise Clause
but also "other constitutional protections").
'7 Id. at 890.
28 See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577,587 (1992); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38,53
n.37 (1985); County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573,591 (1989);
Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).
29 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952).
30 As the Court decided only a handful of cases concerning the freedom of religion prior to
1947, this paper will therefore only cover the doctrines established after 1947. For an analysis
of the cases prior to 1947, see NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 13, § 17.7, at 1290-92.
3' 330 U.S. I.
32 See id. at 3-5.
33 THE WRIINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 281-82 (A. Lipscomb ed., 1904).
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according to the Court. The Court reasoned that the New Jersey statute was
not meant to advance religion because the transportation benefits were
provided to public and private school children alike "regardless of their
religious belief."' Denying these benefits solely to parochial school students
would create a disadvantage for these students. Some of the students would
be forced to choose another school simply because of the denial of these
benefits. Consequently, it would become more difficult for church schools to
operate. Such an effect, the Court concluded, was "obviously not the purpose
of the First Amendment."" Even though the Establishment Clause required
the government to be neutral toward religion, this principle was not violated
here because the money was provided directly to the parents and not to any
school. Holding that the "legislation, as applied, does no more than provide
a general program to help parents get their children, regardless of their
religion, safely and expeditiously to and from accredited schools," '36 the Court
found that the statute did not constitute an establishment of religion by the
government.37
In later cases, the Court applied the strict separation doctrine to decide
several cases involving time release programs in public schools.3" In order to
give students time for religious education, some public schools granted
students time away from classes during the regular school day. In Illinois ex
rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, the Court held such a program to be
unconstitutional because the public school building itself was "used for the
dissemination of religious doctrines," and the public school provided the
pupils for this program "through the use of the State's compulsory public
school machinery., 39 Once again, the Court reaffirmed the principle of strict
separation: "The First Amendment rests upon the premise that both religion
and government can best work to achieve their lofty aims if each is left free
from the other within its respective sphere.'"
Only four years later, in Zorach v. Clausen," however, the Court upheld a
time release program. This decision did not overrule McCollum. Instead,
Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, found the facts in Zorach distin-
34 Everson, 330 U.S. at 16.
31 Id. at 18.
36 Id.
37 See id.
31 See Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 206 (1948); see also
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
39 333 U.S. at 212.
40 Id. at 212.
4' 343 U.S. at 306.
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guishable from the facts in McCollum so that the latter case was not binding
precedent. 2 Unlike the facts in McCollum, the religious instruction in Zorach
took place outside of the public school buildings, and no government funds or
other support were used to finance this religious activity. All costs were paid
by the religious organizations.43 Although the First Amendment "reflects the
philosophy that Church and State should be separated," 4 the Court found the
program in Zorach consistent with this principle of separation because it did
not constitute "a law respecting the establishment of religion within the
meaning of the First Amendment."'5 According to the Court, the First
Amendment does not require a strict separation in "every and all respects," but
"[r]ather ... defines the manner, the specific ways, in which there shall be no
concern or union or dependency one on the other." Therefore, government
can encourage religious instruction as long as it does not finance or provide
religious instruction through its own agencies or institutions, and as long as
government acts neutrally toward religion.47 Because the religious instruction
was not taught by public school teachers on public school property and
because the costs were paid by religious organizations, the Court concluded
that the degree of accommodation of religion in Zorach was not prohibited by
the First Amendment.48
The Court decided the most important cases involving the strict separation
doctrine in the years 1962 and 1963. In 1962, the Court invalidated a New
York statute that required public schools to have a non-denominational prayer
at the beginning of each school day.49 One year later, in School District of
42 Id. at 315 ("We cannot expand it [the McCollum Case] to cover the present released time
program... ."). Justice Jackson, one of the three dissenters, found the distinction between the
two cases "trivial, almost to the point of cynicism." Id. at 325. Instead, just like the two other
dissenters, he pointed out that the two cases were similar and hence comparable. Both programs
did not offer an active alternative for non-believers. Both programs bore the risk of discriminat-
ing against those religions that did not participate in the program, and in both programs, school
officials chose which religions were allowed to participate. See id. at 320, 325.
43 See id. at 308-09.
" Id. at 312 ("There cannot be the slightest doubt that the First Amendment reflects the
philosophy that Church and State should be separated.").
's Id. at 312. Because of this more open approach toward religious accommodation, Zorach
is sometimes seen as the genesis of the accommodation approach. Such an interpretation of
Zorach is incorrect because the Court reaffirmed the principle of strict separation several times
in this decision. See David Felsen, Comment: Developments in Approaches to the Establishment
Clause Analysis: Consistency for the Future, 38 AM. U.L. REV. 395,402 n.48 (1989).
4Zorach, 343 U.S. at 312.
47 See id. at 314.
41 See id. at 314-15.
49 See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
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Abington Township v. Schempp,5 ° the Court banned the practice of Bible
readings in public schools for religious instruction.5' In Engel v. Vitale, Justice
Black, writing for the majority, relied on historical evidence to conclude that
"[t]he First Amendment... tried to put an end to government control of
religion and of prayer. 5 2 By composing an official school prayer, the
government violated the fundamental purpose of the Establishment Clause.
53
In Schempp, the Court expressly held that the First Amendment places the
government in a position of neutrality that "stems from a recognition of the
teachings of history that powerful sects or groups might bring about a fusion
of governmental and religious functions. . . ,"4 In order to be considered
neutral, government action must have a secular purpose. Additionally, it must
create a primarily neutral effect, meaning that the government's action must
neither advance nor discriminate against religion." The Court found that by
requiring the reading of a verse from the Holy Bible or the recitation of the
Lord's Prayer, the legislature enacted the statute to advance religion. Hence,
the statute clearly breached the principle of neutrality. Moreover, the Court
observed:
[I]t is no defense to urge that the religious practices here may
be relatively minor encroachments on the First Amendment.
The breach of neutrality that is today a trickling stream may
all too soon become a raging torrent and. . . it is proper to
take alarm at the first experiment on our liberties.'
In conclusion, it appears that the Court espoused the principle of strict
separation between church and state for over twenty years. At the same time,
the Court realized that at least in some areas, a total separation of church and
state was not possible. As a result, from 1947 to 1970 the Court did not
commit to one specific criterion to determine the line of separation between
'0 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
", The Court did not hold that the reading of the Bible for historical reasons would also be
prohibited. See id. at 225-26.
52 370 U.S. at 435.
53 See id. at 424; see also id. at 443 (Douglas, J., concurring) (stating that "[t]he First
Amendment leaves the government in a position not of hostility to religion but of neutrality" and
that a government composed prayer would violate this principle because it would enforce
religious practice).
'4 Schempp, 374 U.S. at 215, 222.
's See id. at 222.
56 Id. at 225 (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted).
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church and state but rather decided Establishment Clause cases on a case by
case basis.57 This ad hoc approach to strict separation led to perceptions of
inconsistencies in the resulting body of law.58 Responding to these percep-
tions, the majority,59 beginning with Schempp and Engel, developed two
unifying criteria for evaluating Establishment Clause cases focusing on the
purpose and the effect of the challenged government action. These two
considerations, together with a third one developed in Walz v. Tax Commis-
sion,' were merged into the three-part Lemon test in 1971.61
b. The Lemon Test (19 70s-1990s). Although the Court had emphasized
several criteria in assessing Establishment Clause challenges before 1971, the
Court did not expressly tie these doctrines together in a single test until Lemon
v. Kurtzman.62 Beginning with Lemon, the Court used the newly established
three-part test to decide almost all of the Establishment Clause cases until the
early 1990s.63
In Lemon, the Court struck down two statutes that provided financial aid to
church-related schools. Both statutes sponsored the teaching of secular
subjects in religious schools by allowing the state either to pay money directly
to the teacher" or by allowing the state to reimburse the schools for their
actual expenses for teachers and textbooks. 65 Delivering the opinion for the
majority, Chief Justice Burger began with an overview of the previous
decisions in which the Court had developed three different tests to determine
Establishment Clause violations. He combined these criteria into one test that
a statute' had to pass in order to be consistent with the Establishment Clause:
17 See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).
58 See Zorach, 343 U.S. at 322-23 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. at
442 (Douglas, J., concurring).
'9 See Walz, 397 U.S. at 668 ("The considerable internal inconsistency in the opinions of the
Court derives from what, in retrospect, may have been to sweeping utterances on aspects of these
clauses that seemed clear in relation to the particular cases but have limited meaning as general
principles.").
60 Id. at 674.
6' See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (establishing the three-part test to determine
Establishment Clause violations).
62 Id. at 657-58 (Brennan, J., concurring).
In several cases, however, the Court did not apply the Lemon test. See, e.g., County of
Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 109 (1989); Marsh v. Chambers, 463
U.S. 783 (1983); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1983).
6See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 607 (the Rhode Island statute).
6 See id. at 609 (the Pennsylvania statute).
6In the mid 1980s, the Court expanded the application of the Lemon test to any
governmental practice. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,680 (1984) (citing cases in which
the Court has "invalidated legislation or governmental action on the ground that a secular
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"First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal
or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion;
finally, the statute must not foster an excessive government entanglement with
religion."67
The statutes at issue in the case violated the third prong, because "the
cumulative impact of the entire relationship arising under the statute in each
state involve[d] excessive entanglement between government and religion. 68
In Rhode Island, the sole beneficiary was the Roman Catholic elementary
school that, according to the Court, had a "substantial religious character," and
the governmental support provided by the statute would necessarily have led
to an excessive entanglement of government with religion.69 In order to ensure
that the government money was given to teachers only for teaching plainly
secular subjects, it would have been necessary for the government to supervise
and to require "comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state
surveillance" of teachers. 70 "These prophylactic contacts" the Court argued,
"[would] involve excessive and enduring entanglement between state and
church.' Because the educational system in Pennsylvania was "very similar
to the one existing in Rhode Island," the Court found that this statute also
fostered an excessive entanglement between government and religion.72 Thus,
because both statutes already failed the third prong of the Court's test, Chief
Justice Burger did not see the need to examine the legislative intent nor to
decide whether the statute's primary effect was to advance religion.7 ' Later
cases, however, clarified the meaning of both the purpose and the effects
prongs, as well as the prohibition on excessive government entanglement.
To avoid conflict with the Establishment Clause, the government action
must have a clear secular purpose.74 The term "secular" has been interpreted
purpose was lacking"); Committee for Public Ed. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,
773 (1973).
67 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
6 Id. at 613 (emphasis omitted).
69 Id. at 616-17.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 619.
72 Id. at 620-21.
71 See id. at 613-14.
74 See Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968). This case upheld a statute that
allowed local school boards to loan textbooks to non-public schools. The underlying
government purpose, "the furtherance of educational opportunities available to the young," was
considered to be a clearly secular legislative purpose. Id.
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by the Court very broadly." A narrow interpretation, allowing purposes to be
deemed secular only if they neither help nor hinder religion, would make
almost every government action invalid.76
To decide whether the purpose is secular, Justice O'Connor suggested that
the decision should be made from the viewpoint of an "objective observer,
acquainted with the text, legislative history, and implementation of the
[challenged] statute. 77  The Court has generally followed this way of
determining the statute's purpose.78
It is not sufficient for the govenment just to assert a secular purpose. On
the contrary, the Court may question the asserted purpose and reach its own
conclusion as to whether the state's actual purpose is secular. Indeed, there are
cases in which the Court has invalidated a law because it lacked a clear secular
purpose, even though the government explicitly asserted one.79
Closely related to the secular purpose test is the second part of the Lemon
test. The government must not only have a clear secular purpose for its actions
but its actions must also have a neutral primary effect on religion. The
distinction between the first prong and the second involves the question of the
government's underlying intention for the action. Under the first prong, if the
government intends to affect religion, the challenged action is invalid." The
71 Professor Laurence Tribe points out that the Court in Corporation ofthe PresidingBishop
of the Church ofJesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos has even "suggested that the purpose
inquiry does not demand that the law's purpose must be unrelated to religion; instead, the
requirement aims at preventing the relevant governmental decisionmaker... from abandoning
neutrality and acting with the intent of promoting a particular point of view in religious matters."
TRIBE, supra note 5, § 14-9, at 1212 (footnote omitted). Professor Tribe criticizes this
interpretation as "going too far" and, instead, prefers Justice O'Connor's "objective observer"
approach. See id. § 14-9, at 1212.
76 See TRIBE, supra note 5, § 14-9, at 1205 (giving the example of laws against murder that
would violate the fifth commandment of the Mosaic Decalogue).
7 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 76 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
78 See TRIBE, supra note 5, § 14-9, at 1205.
See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968). The Court invalidated a statute that
prohibited the teaching of evolution in public schools. As there was no record of the reasons for
the statute's enactment, the Court concluded that the law was enacted to protect certain religious
beliefs and was without any secular purpose. See id. at 109; see also Wallace v. Jaffree, 472
U.S. 38, 56 (1985) (invalidating an Alabama statute that required a moment of silence for prayer
in public schools at the beginning of each school day as the statute was not motivated by any
clearly secular purpose); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980) (invalidating a statute that
required the posting of the Ten Commandments in public schools, based on the conclusion that
the posting of the Ten Commandments, as a "sacred text," lacked a secular purpose but was
"plainly religious").
a' Of course this would also be a violation of the second prong of the Lemon test. See TRIBE,
supra note 5, § 14-10, at 1215.
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second prong, in contrast, looks at the action's effect, regardless of the
intention. Thus, even if the government has a legitimate secular purpose, the
challenged action would still be unconstitutional if it has either a positive or
negative effect on religious groups.
The question arising under the second prong of Lemon is how to define
"primary neutral effect." Does the word "neutral" mean that there must be no
effect at all on religion? Such an interpretation would go too far because a
total separation between church and state is impossible to attain." Many
government actions, such as the regulation of building and zoning and the
provision of police and fire protection, have an effect on religion even though
the effect is unintentional. 2 A principle that denies generally available public
services to religious institutions or practitioners would not only conflict with
the Free Exercise Clause but would also be impossible to implement.
Having recognized that "some relationship between government and
religious organizations is inevitable," 3 the Court has not demanded that
government action have purely secular effects. Instead, the term "primary
neutral effect" means that the secular effects must outweigh the non-secular
effects in such a way that the overall effect is deemed secular."
Except for areas in which the secular and non-secular effects are obvious,
"primary effect" analysis involves a very intensive and fact-sensitive
analysis."5 In these types of cases, the Court first has to gather all the facts
"I See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
32 See id. at 312 ("The First Amendment, however, does not say that in every and all respects
there shall be a separation of Church and State. Rather it studiously defines the manner, the
specific ways, in which there shall be no concert or union or dependency one on the other...
Otherwise the state and religion would be aliens to each other-hostile, suspicious, and even
unfriendly.").
13 Id. at 312.
" See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 681 (1984). The Court held that a crche display
had a primary secular effect. See id. The Court reached this decision by comparing the effects
created by the creche display to the effects produced by textbook loans to parochial schools and
by the expenditure of public funds for school bus transportation for parochial school students.
See id. at 681-82. According to the Court, the display of a cr che could not have a greater effect
on religion than the other benefits to religion that the Court has found non-violative of the
Establishment Clause. See id. at 682.
85 See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997). This case upheld a New York program
under which public school teachers were sent into parochial schools during regular school hours
to provide remedial education to disadvantaged children. In this decision, the Court analyzed
whether the program would create the impermissible effect of advancing religion. See id. at 23 1-
53. For further cases in which the Court has undertaken an extensive analysis of the second
prong of the Lemon test, see Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 236-55 (1977); Meek v.
Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349,360-73 (1975); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 239,243-48 (1968).
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concerning the possible effects that may arise from the challenged action. In
the second step, the Court weighs these effects against each other in order to
find the overall tendency. In Wolman v. Walter, for example, the Court
considered the constitutionality of an Ohio statute that, among other things,
authorized the expenditure of public funds to provide speech, hearing, and
psychological services in non-public schools.8 6 The appellants argued that the
speech and hearing staff and the psychological diagnosticians "might engage
in unrestricted conversation with the pupil and, on occasion, might fail to
separate religious instruction from secular responsibilities" and thus advance
religion."7
The Court, however, rejected this argument and held that "the provision of
health services to all school children-public and nonpublic-[did] not have
the primary effect of aiding religion." 8  Justice Blackmun, writing the
majority opinion, stated that diagnostic services were not as closely related to
the "educational mission of nonpublic schools" as other core services like
teaching.or counseling. 9 Hence, he concluded that the "pressure on the public
diagnostician to allow the intrusion of sectarian views [was] greatly
reduced."' In addition, the contact between the children and the diagnosticians
was also sufficiently limited so that providing these services would "not create
the impermissible risk of the fostering of ideological views."'"
For an effect of government action to matter, it is not important whether the
effect was specifically intended by the government. The only requirement is
that the effect must be created directly by the government action.92 As in the
first prong of the Lemon test, the Court has refrained from simply relying on
Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. at 241.
s Id. at 242. Concerning the employment situation of the speech and hearing staff, the
Court noted "that the personnel (with the exception of physicians) who perform the services are
employees of the local board of education; that physicians may be hired on a contract basis; that
the purpose of these services is to determine the pupil's deficiency or need of assistance; and that
treatment of any defect so found would take place off the nonpublic school premises." Id. at
241.
1s Id. at 242.
'9 Id. at 244.
9 Id.
91 Id.
' See Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 337 (1987) ("For a law to have forbidden 'effects' underLemon,
it must be fair to say that the government itself has advanced religion through its own activities
and influence. As the Court observed in Walz, 'for the men who-wrote the Religion Clauses of
the First Amendment the "establishment" of a religion connoted sponsorship, financial support,
and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.' ") (quoting Waltz, 397 U.S. at
668).
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official government statements concerning possible effects. Instead, especially
when the action has also created non-secular effects, the Court has undertaken
a more extensive analysis. For example, in one of its school prayer cases,
School District ofAbington Township v. Schempp, the Court recognized as a
secular effect the achievement of "the promotion of moral values, the
contradiction to the materialistic trends of our time, the perpetuation of [the
American] institutions and the teaching of literature."93 But in the end, the
Court concluded that the non-secular effects of Bible reading without comment
clearly outweighed the practice's admitted secular effects ."
In summary, the second prong of the Lemon test asks whether the overall
effect the government action will most likely create is secular or neutral. If
this is the case, the challenged action has passed the second test, and the Court
will move on to the last prong of the Lemon test.
In Lemon, the Court explained:
In order to determine whether the government entanglement
with religion is excessive, we must examine the character and
purposes of the institutions that are benefited, the nature of
the aid that the State provides, and the resulting relationship
between the government and the religious authority.9 5
The third prong of the Lemon test perhaps corresponds most closely with
the framers' intent in creating the First Amendment. History teaches us that
church and state should not interfere in each other's "respective spheres of
choice and influence." 9 Because total separation is impossible, the require-
ment of non-entanglement necessarily involves matters of degree. Only when
the government interferes extensively with religion is the action unconstitu-
tional. But how extensive must this entanglement be to fail this test?
To answer this question, it is helpful to distinguish between the different
ways in which the government might interfere in religious spheres. Professor
Laurence H. Tribe has identified five different kinds of entanglement. 97 Two
of these forms of entanglement are relevant to the issue of religion in public
schools, and this paper will focus on them.
93 School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963).
" See id. at 224 ("But even if its purpose is not strictly religious, it is sought to be
accomplished through readings, without comment, from the Bible.").
95 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,615 (1971).
" TRBE, supra note 5, § 14-11, at 1226.
97 See id. § 14-11, at 1226-31.
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First, government may become entangled with religion when it delegates
some of its power to religious institutions. There can be no doubt that this
kind of entanglement is excessive." To allow such delegations would not
simply breach the "wall of separation" between church and state; it would
likely tear it down. The very purpose of religion is that each action motivated
by it reflects religious doctrine. Therefore, the exercise of government power
reflects religious viewpoints if it is exercised by religious institutions. This
threatens the core purpose of the First Amendment and the fiamers' intent to
separate church and state. Thus, the Court has held that giving churches such
a place in the process of government would be an offensive violation of the
spirit of the Constitution."
Another category of unconstitutional entanglement is excessive administra-
tive entanglement."° This kind of entanglement arises when the government
intends to provide aid for a secular purpose. To achieve this goal the
government often has no choice but to monitor the operations of the religious
organization. But by doing so the government interferes with the organiza-
tion's autonomy. In some cases, government aid to religious organizations,
even though it passes the first two prongs of the Lemon test, will fail the third
prong for this reason. On the other hand, there are ways to provide govern-
ment aid to religious institutions without offending the non-entanglement rule.
Lending textbooks for secular subjects to parochial students and paying
subsidies for their bus transportation to school, for example, are not considered
by the Court to create an excessive entanglement. On the other hand, paying
the salaries of the teachers of secular subjects in parochial schools was
considered to be an excessive entanglement' because government officials
had to visit the school-perhaps extensively-to verify that the subject and the
way the teacher taught it were genuinely non-religious.0 2
9s See Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982) (striking down a Massachusetts
law that granted religious institutions the right to veto applications for liquor licenses for sites
located within 500 feet of the institution).
99 See id. at 127.
100 See TRiBE, supra note 5, § 14-11, at 1228.
'0' See generally Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (writing for the majority, Justice
Blackmun gives a good overview of the Court's decisions concerning government aid to non-
secular schools).
'02 See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619 ("A comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state
surveillance will inevitably be required to ensure that these restrictions are obeyed and the First
Amendment otherwise respected.").
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The Justices most often criticize the entanglement prong of the Lemon
test.'0 3 In his dissenting opinion in Wallace v. Jaffree, Justice Rehnquist
suggested that the Court abandon the Lemon test completely and decide the
Establishment Clause cases in a more restricted way based on the intent of the
framers of the First Amendment. ' He agreed with Justice White, who in his
concurrence in Roemer v. Board of Public Works of Maryland'5 pointed out
that the entanglement prong becomes "insolubly paradoxical" when it is
separated from its original context. According to Justice White, this would be
true especially in school aid cases. If the government provides aid to parochial
schools, it generally has to supervise the secular use of this aid in order to pass
the effect prong of the Lemon test. This close supervision, however, frequently
creates an excessive entanglement with religion and makes the aid unconstitu-
tional. According to Justice Rehnquist, "This type of self-defeating result is
certainly not required to ensure that States do not establish religions."'' °
Justice O'Connor, on the other hand, would not "abandon all aspects of the
Lemon test" but instead would redefine it. 7 Instead of deciding each case
separately based on historical and textual evaluation of the First Amendment,
Justice O'Connor prefers a single standard principle that would be applicable
to all conflicts.0" In her concurrence in Lynch v. Donnelly, she stated that the
standard to determine Establishment Clause violations should be whether the
government has endorsed religion. " This endorsement test would combine the
first two criteria of the Lemon test by asking "whether government's purpose
is to endorse religion and whether the statute actually conveys a message of
endorsement.""0 Concerning the third prong of the Lemon test-the excessive
government entanglement inquiry-Justice O'Connor found that the factors
the Court used to determine excessive entanglement were the same as the
factors used to guage whether the effect of the challenged action was primarily
"os See, e.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 430 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(proposing the inclusion of the entanglement test into the effect test); Lemon, 403 U.S. at 664-71
(White, J., concurring) (stating that the entanglement test would be only a restatement of the
effect test); Roemer v. Board of Public Works of Maryland, 426 U.S. 736, 769 (1976) (White,
J., concurring).
'0o See 472 U.S. 38, 112-13 (1985).
'0o 426 U.S. at 769 (White, J., concurring).
'06 Wallace, 472 U.S. at 110 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
'07 Id. at 68 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
'o8 See id. at 68-69.
"o Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-89 (1984).
"o Wallace, 472 U.S. at 69 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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neutral."' Hence, she concluded that the excessive entanglement issue should
be treated "as an aspect of the inquiry into a statute's effect.""
2
The Lemon test has encountered extensive criticism. The decision itself
was not unanimous, and many subsequent opinions have distinguished
Lemon". or criticized it." 4 Justice O'Connor, for example, has said that a
strict application of the test "may sometimes do more harm than good."".5
Despite widespread criticism, the Supreme Court cited the Lemon test in
"virtually all Establishment Clause cases between the early 1970s and the
1990s.,,11 However, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, without expressly
rejecting or overruling the Lemon test, the Court started to move away from
applying it.1
7
Does this mean that the Lemon test has ceased to be valid? The answer
must be no. The Supreme Court has never explicitly abandoned Lemon, and
the doctrine of stare decisis requires the lower courts to take precedent as
binding as long as it has not been overruled. "[O]nly the Supreme Court may
overrule one of its own precedents and until such occurs, precedent is still
good law.""'
c. Modern Doctrines. In the late 1980s and early 1990s the Court
seemed to move away from the Lemon test by basing its decisions on two other
criteria: (1) whether the government had endorsed religion and (2) whether the
government had coerced religious practice. Not many Establishment Clause
cases have been brought before the Supreme Court since 1990, so analysis of
these two new criteria is limited to two major cases."'
" See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 256-57 (1997).
112 Id. at 257.
... See Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993)
(holding that to avoid violating the Free Speech Clause, the church should have access to school
premises); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39,40 (1980) (discussing the secular legislative purpose
of a Kentucky statute requiring the posting of the Ten Commandments in classrooms).
"4 See Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works of Md., 426 U.S. 736, 767 (1976).
"' Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 718 (1994);
see also TRIBE, supra note 5, § 17-3, at 1224 n.4.
"16 NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 13, § 17.3, at 1223.
"1 See Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994); Lee
v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492
U.S. 573 (1989).
118 Thurston Motor Lines, Inc. v. Jordan K. Rand, Ltd., 460 U.S. 533, 535 (1983).
"9 See County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (for the
"endorsement" test); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 573 (1992) (for the "coercion" test).
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The Supreme Court applied the "endorsement" test for the first time in
1989 in County ofAllegheny v. American CivilLiberties Union. 20 In this case,
the Court decided the constitutionality of a Christmas display. In contrast to
its decision in Lynch v. Donnelly 2' five years earlier, the Court found that the
Christmas display violated the Establishment Clause.
22
Writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun started with an overview of
previous Establishment Clause cases and the doctrines the Court applied.' 23
Concerning the recent cases, he found that the Court had "paid particularly
close attention to whether the challenged governmental practice either has the
purpose or effect of 'endorsing' religion. ... . Referring to previous
decisions, he provided a definition for endorsement: government action is
considered to be endorsing religion if it "convey[s] or attempt[s] to convey a
message that religion or a particular religious belief is favored or preferred."''t 2
Justice Blackmun then analyzed the logic of Lynch. Finding the "rationale
of the majority opinion in Lynch ... none too clear,"'26 he concluded that
Justice O'Connor's concurrence supplied a "sound analytical framework for
evaluating governmental use of religious symbols.' ' 27 According to Justice
O'Connor, government should be prohibited from any endorsement of religion,
because it "send[s] a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full
members of the political community, and an accompanying message to
adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political
community."' 2' The four dissenters in Lynch had agreed with Justice
O'Connor on the application of the endorsement test but had come to a
different conclusion when they applied the test. 29 Because five Justices had
applied the criteria of "endorsement" as the decisive element in Lynch, Justice
Blackmun in Allegheny concluded that "government's use of religious
symbolism [was] unconstitutional if it [had] the effect of endorsing religious
beliefs, and the effect of the government's use of religious symbols depend[ed]
120 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (holding that the display of a creche violated the Establishment
Clause).
121 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (upholding as valid a city's Christmas display that contained in
addition to a cr6che a Santa Claus with reindeer and a Christmas tree).
1 See County ofAllegheny, 492 U.S. at 621.
" See id. at 589-93.
124 Id. at 592.
125 Id. at 593 (citing Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 70 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
'26 Id. at 594.
127 Id. at 595.
'28 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
'29 See id. at 717 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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on its context." 3° Because the county's display of a cr6che was without other
secular symbols but instead was accompanied by a sign saying that the creche
was provided by a Roman Catholic organization, the Court found government
endorsement of religion to be present. 3 ' The majority's application of the
non-endorsement principle, however, was drawn into question just three years
later when Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court's majority in Lee v.
Weisman.
32
In Lee v. Weisman, 3a the Court ruled on the constitutionality of a non-
denominational prayer delivered by a clergy member at a public school
graduation ceremony. While four justices wanted to uphold this practice, five
found the prayer to be unconstitutional."3 The five justices who made up the
Court's majority reached this result using a variety of analytical techniques.
Justice Kennedy based the majority opinion mainly on the element of
coercion.135 Because the graduation ceremony plays such an important part in
a student's life, the argument that the students were free to leave the ceremony
"lacks all persuasion" and rests on "pure formalism.' 36 In reality graduating
students were effectively coerced into participate in religious ceremonies. In
addition to this element of coercion, Justice Kennedy recognized an excessive
involvement of the government in the religious exercise. 37 The graduation
ceremony is a public school ceremony, held on school property, and the prayer
had to follow certain guidelines established by school officials.' 3 According
to Justice Kennedy, all these "dominant facts mark and control" the decision
to invalidate the prayer.
39
The "coercion" test asks whether the government directly or indirectly
coerces people to favor a certain religion. In Lee v. Weisman itself, however,
four of the Justices preferred to decide the case on the basis of other criteria.
Justice Blackmun, who was joined by Justice O'Connor and Justice Stevens,
based his concurrence on the "endorsement" test. Moreover, Justice Souter,
joined by Justices O'Connor and Stevens, openly expressed doubts about the
"coercion" test by stating that none of the precedents "support[ed] the position
130 County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 597 (1989).
131 See id. at 600.
131 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
3 Id. at 580.
"3 See id. at 579.
131 See id. at 598-99.
136 Id. at 595.
1'7 See id. at 594.
"3 See id. at 584, 588.
39 Id. at 586.
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that a showing of coercion [was] necessary to a successful Establishment
Clause claim."1'40 Thus, the importance and relevance of the "coercion" test in
future cases may very well be doubted.
d. Doctrinal Development after Lee v. Weisman. In the major
Establishment Clause cases that followed Lee v. Weisman, the Court did not
base its decisions on the Lemon test.141 In Board of Education of Kiryas Joel
Village School District v. Gumet, "'2 the Court did not even mention the Lemon
test 43 but instead based its decision on the principle of government
neutrality.'" Further, in Agostini v. Felton145 the Court had to decide about a
New York City program under which public school teachers were sent to
parochial schools during regular school hours to provide remedial education
for disadvantaged children. By a five-to-four vote, the Court upheld the
program and overruled in principal part its prior decisions in Aguilar v.
Felton'46 and in School District of Grand Rapids v. Ball.147 Writing for the
majority, Justice O'Connor began with a brief summary of the Court's
holdings Aguilar and Ball. In both cases, one of the major arguments for the
invalidation of the programs was the danger that the public employees "may
well subtly (or overtly) conform their instruction to the [pervasively sectarian]
'40 Id. at 619.
1 1 See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (upholding a New York City program
under which public school teachers were sent into parochial schools to provide remedial
instruction for disadvantaged children); Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v.
Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994) (holding that a New York statute that created a public school
district along the lines of a village in which all inhabitants were members of the Satmar Hasidic
sect would violate the Establishment Clause); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S.
1 (1993) (upholding the constitutionality of a state law that required the government to provide
a sign language interpreter for a deaf student who attended a parochial school).
142 512 U.S. 687 (1994).
143 The fact that the Court did not mention Lemon in its decision led Justice O'Connor to
conclude that the Court had departed from using the Lemon test. In her eyes this departure from
Lemon was a step forward. See id. at 721. Justice Blacknun, on the other hand, did not
consider the Court's decision in Grumet as a departure from the Lemon test. He argued that
although the Court did not apply the Lemon test, it nevertheless referred to decisions that
"explicitly rested on the criteria set forth in Lemon." Id. at 710.
'4 See id. at 696-97.
14' 21 U.S. 203 (1997).
'46 473 U.S. 402 (1985) (invalidating a program that used federal funds to pay the salaries
of public school teachers who provided remedial instruction to parochial school students).
'47 School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985) (invalidating a released time
program that provided remedial instruction to non-public school students at public expense on
private school premises and a program that required government to pay parochial school teachers
who taught "community education" in a wholly secular manner after class in parochial schools).
In Agostini, the Court only overruled the first program.
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environment in which they teach."' 48 This proposition, as Justice O'Connor
noted in Agostini, has never been proven and "there is no reason to presume
that, simply because she enters a parochial school classroom, a full-time public
employee... will depart from her assigned duties and instructions....
Justice O'Connor enumerated the three criteria that the Court "currently use[s]
to evaluate whether government aid has the effect of advancing religion."'50
In order to be consistent with the Establishment Clause government aid should
not (1) result in governmental indoctrination of religion, (2) define its
beneficiaries based on religion, or (3) create an excessive entanglement with
religion.'5' In Agostini, the Court did not find any of these circumstances to
be present and therefore upheld the program.
After examining these cases, it appears that the Court has not overruled
Lemon. Thus, although the Court has refrained from applying it during the
past ten years, the Lemon test is still applicable. However, because of its many
inconsistencies and the criticism it has received, it is doubtful whether the
Court will ever use the Lemon test again. Justice O'Connor has said that a
return to the Lemon test "would likely be futile."'52 In her opinion, a "less
unitary approach [would] provide[] a better structure for analysis" by adapting
Establishment Clause analysis to particular contexts in which the Establish-
ment Clause problems arise. 1 3 In light of this, Agostini can be seen as an
attempt to define new criteria for deciding Establishment Clause cases
concerning the constitutionality of government aid to religious schools.
However, in its most recent case, Santa Fe Independent School District v.
Doe, Justice Stevens, who delivered the opinion of the Court, referred to
Lemon. " In order to invalidate the District's argument "that the facial
challenge must fail because 'Santa Fe's Football Policy cannot be invalidated
on the basis of some "possibility or even likelihood" of an unconstitutional
application,' "the Court applied the first prong of the Lemon test, finding that
the policy had a clear secular purpose."' The Court stated: "The District,
nevertheless, asks us to pretend that we do not recognize what every Santa Fe
High School Student understands clearly-that this policy is about prayer.' 56
141 Grand Rapids, 473 U.S. at 388.
149 Agostini, 521 U.S. at 226.
ISO Id. at 234.
151 See id.
112 Grumet, 512 U.S. at 721.
153 id.
'5 120 S. Ct. 2266 (2000).
15' Id. at 2281.
"s6 1d. at 2282.
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However, even though the Court applied the Lemon test, the argumentation
was mainly based on the coercion criteria established in Lee v. Weisman.'
The secular purpose argument, by contrast, can be seen as an additional
argument with only an auxiliary function.
The three dissenters's, however, sharply criticized the use of the Lemon
test. Taking all this into account, it cannot be said that the Court has
reestablished the Lemon test. Quite to the contrary, it is more probable that the
Court will refrain from using the Lemon test unless there are other more
obvious principles like endorsement or coercion of religion.
C. The Free Exercise Clause
1. Overview. The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment states that
"Congress shall make no law... prohibiting the free exercise" of religion.'
The term "free exercise" not only embraces the freedom to act but it also
encompasses the freedom to believe.'59 Further, the Free Exercise Clause
protects the right of individuals who choose not to believe in any religion or
not to engage in any religious practice because, "Ii]ust as the right to speak and
the right to refrain from speaking," the right to believe and the right not to
believe are "complementary components."'"
To what extent may the government burden the free exercise of religion?
The Court held in 1879 that the freedom to believe is considered to be
absolute.'6 ' Upholding a congressional statute that prohibited the practice of
polygamy, the Court held that, while the Free Exercise Clause prevented
Congress from interfering "with mere religious belief," it could well interfere
with religious practice. 62 In Cantwell v. Connecticut,63 the Court reaffirmed
this distinction and added that religious conduct might be regulated insofar as
the regulations would not unduly "infringe the protected freedom."'"
Accordingly, while some infringement of religious conduct may be allowed,
some is clearly prohibited. Thus, there are line-drawing problems.
157 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
... U.S. CONST. amend. I.
"' See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879); see also Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940).
16 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52 (1985).
161 See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166.
162 Id. at 166.
16' 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (invalidating a state statute that required a permit for those soliciting
for religious or charitable causes).
'6' Id. at 304.
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2. Judicial Doctrines in Free Exercise Clause Cases. The best way to
draw the line between permissible and impermissible regulation of religious
conduct is to first distinguish between laws that burden religion directly and
laws that are religiously neutral. The Court has developed different doctrines
to deal with these different categories of laws, applying strict scrutiny if the
law burdens religion directly and minimal scrutiny if the law is neutral.'6
Laws that are not religiously neutral are those that encroach on religious
belief or impose burdens on people simply because of their religious beliefs.
Such laws presumptively violate the Free Exercise Clause.'" In Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, for example, the Court invalidated a law
that prohibited animal slaughter. 67  Although the law was in principle
generally applicable, it contained so many exemptions that under the surface
it was directed only toward a particular sect. Writing for the majority, Justice
Kennedy noted that "[t]he challenged law had an impermissible object; and in
all events the principle of general applicability was violated because the
secular ends asserted in defense of the law, were pursued only with respect to
conduct motivated by religious beliefs."' 6 As a result, it makes no difference
if a law is per se discriminatory or if it was originally enacted as a generally
applicable law with the purpose of burdening a religion. In both cases the law
is unconstitutional. The burden of proof rests with the person or the group that
feels discriminated against by the law. The plaintiff has to prove that the
"legislative purpose was the promotion of religious beliefs or the suppression
of the religious practice of a religious sect."' 69 Such a law is then subject to
strict judicial scrutiny, meaning that in order to uphold the law, the govern-
ment must prove a compelling government interest and that the law is
"narrowly tailored to advance that interest."'
' 70
Religiously neutral laws are generally applicable laws that only incidentally
burden a certain religious belief or practice. A state statute that required
compulsory school attendance for all children until the age of sixteen was such
'6 See generally NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 13, § 17.6, at 1278-90 (providing a
comprehensive overview of the two classifications and their treatment by the Court).
'" See id. § 17.6, at 1278 ("A law would be invalid if the legislature passed the law
prohibiting some type of activity only because of the religious belief displayed by the activity
or only because the government wished to burden a particular religion.").
167 508 U.S. 520, 532 (1993).
'"Id. at 532.
16 NowAK & RoTuNDA, supra note 13, § 17.8, at 1278.
170 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 534.
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a general applicable law. 171 The state's purpose in enacting such a statute is
certainly not to burden religion but to provide children with a better education
and to foster their "development as citizens and members of the society."' 72
Nevertheless, the statute may burden religious groups that believe that school
education after a certain age would be contrary to their religious principles. 73
Hence, in this case a law-although generally applicable and enacted without
the intent to burden religion-nevertheless conflicts with the religious
principles of the adherents of some religious sects by making it difficult or
impossible for them to comply with the law and their religious beliefs at the
same time.
In some cases, the Supreme Court has formally distinguished generally
applicable laws that burden religion directly and laws that burden religion only
indirectly.' 74 Many states, for example, prohibit the use of illegal drugs.'
Some religious sects, however, use illegal drugs during their religious
ceremonies. The prohibition of illegal drug use by law burdens religion
directly by making the use of the drug in the religious ceremony illegal. A law
would burden religion indirectly, on the other hand, if it were to make
religious exercise more difficult for practitioners instead of "regulat[ing] a
religiously motivated practice as such."1 76 Sunday closing laws, for example,
indirectly burden Sabbatarians, who refrain from working for religious reasons
on Saturdays. In order to comply with their religious beliefs, Sabbatarians
must close their shops two days a week and thus face additional economic
costs. "'77 Today, however, the Court applies the same doctrines and guiding
171 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding a state statute unconstitutional that
required compulsory school attendance for Amish school children after the eighth grade).
172 NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 13, § 17.8, at 1302.
171 See, e.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. at 205 (holding that the state by mandating further school
education for Amish children would endanger the fundamental religious principles of the Amish
people who lived their daily lives according to these principles).
74 See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 13, § 17.6, at 1280.
17S See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-64-401 (Michie 1997); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §
11350 (West 1999); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-29-139 (1998) (prohibiting the possession of certain
drugs).
176 NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 13, § 17.6, at 1280. Nowak and Rotunda add that
religious practice is usually burdened by the imposition of additional economic costs on the
practitioners. Faced with these additional costs, many believers would probably refrain from
religious practice. See id.
" See, e.g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606-07 (1961) (upholding Pennsylvania's
Sunday closing law even though it imposed an indirect burden on religious exercise because of
its legitimate purpose to create a uniform "family day of rest"); McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420 (1961) (upholding a state law requiring business closures on Sunday).
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principles for generally applicable laws whether they burden religion directly
or indirectly.78
Generally applicable laws cannot be challenged as unconstitutional because
they solely favor or disfavor religion. In most cases, the plaintiff must instead
seek an exemption from the law because of his or her religious beliefs. In
general, the Court tends to deny such exemptions from generally applicable
law.' 79 Nevertheless, there have been some cases in which the Court has
provided an exemption under the Free Exercise Clause. 8
The judicial protection of the free exercise of religion prior to 1963 was
relatively weak. Religious minorities suffered the most from this weakness.'8'
For example, the Court upheld several laws that restricted the practices of
Mormons, especially polygamy.'82 In the 1940s and 1950s the Court provided
more protection to religion. However, the decisions were not primarily based
on the Free Exercise Clause but on the right of free speech." 3
The years between 1963 and 1990 could probably best be described as the
"balancing era" because the Court applied a two-step balancing test in order
to determine whether a person had the right to an exemption from a generally
applicable law because of religious beliefs."S First, the person had to show that
the challenged law actually imposed a burden on his religious practice. 8
Then, in a second step, the Court required the government to demonstrate a
compelling government interest for burdening this religious practice and for
not granting an exemption.8 6 The Court thus balanced the interest of the
"n See NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 13, § 17.6, at 1280 (stating that "the distinction
between direct and indirect burdens does not have any legal significance").
" See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990); Lyng v. Northwest Indian
Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986);
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
1" See, e.g., Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Florida, 480 U.S. 136 (1987);
Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972);
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
'81 See NowA & ROTUNDA, supra note 13, § 17.6, at 1281-84, 1290-93.
182 See Barlow v. Utah, 324 U.S. 829 (1945) (per curium); Davis v. Baeson, 133 U.S. 333
(1890); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
" See West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (invalidating a statute
that required students to take part in the daily flag salute at school); Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296 (1940) (invalidating a statute that required a permit for solicitors for religious or
charitable causes). For further examples, see also NowAK& ROTUNDA, supra note 13, § 17.7,
at 1292 n. 11.
'84 See NoWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 13, § § 17.6, 17.7, at 1280-83, 1293 (describing the
balancing test).
'a' See id. at 1281.
16 Seeki.
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government in not granting an exception with the burden on the free exercise
right of the individual. According to this balancing test, "A statute may stand
only if the law in general, and the State's refusal to allow a religious
exemption in particular, are justified by a compelling interest that cannot be
served by less restrictive means.'
s8 7
Although this may seem to be an unusually stringent requirement for the
government to meet, in most of these cases the government interest did
outweigh the individual's burden, and the Court denied the exemption.' In
United States v. Lee, the Court found that society's interest in having a
functioning Social Security system outweighed the interest of an Amish
worker attempting to avoid contributions to this system because of his
religious beliefs.i8 9 The Court reasoned that the reliability and the functioning
of this system depended on the contributions of everybody and that granting
exemptions from these contributions would severely endanger its
functioning.'"
The Court found the same to be true in taxation cases.' 9' In fact, there were
only two areas in which the Court granted exemptions from generally
applicable laws for religious beliefs. One was the area of compulsory school
education for Amish children,92 and the other was the area of unemployment
compensation.'93
Unemployment regulation statutes frequently deny unemployment benefits
to workers if they leave their jobs voluntarily. The reason for such a
regulation is to prevent the misuse of the system by workers "as a type of paid
vacation."'" In Sherbert v. Verner, the Court for the first time required the
government to make an exemption for people who voluntarily refused to work
187 Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,907 (1990)
(Blackmun J., dissenting).
188 SeeNOWAK&ROTUNDA,supra note 13, § 17.6, at 1290 ("But, during the quarter century
in which the Court used that test, it almost always ruled in favor of the government.") (footnote
omitted).
"89 United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982).
90 See id. at 258-59.
'91 See NOwAK& ROTUNDA, supra note 13, § 17.6, at 1285.
"9 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (requiring government to grant exemption
from compulsory school attendance for Amish children because of their religious beliefs).
'93 See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (granting unemployment benefits to a
worker who refused to take an offered job to work on Saturday because of her religious beliefs).
19 NOwAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 13, § 17.6, at 1282 (explaining the purpose of this
government regulation in more detail).
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based on their religious beliefs.195 In a series of later unemployment
compensation cases the Court continued to adhere to this rule."g
In 1990, the Court decided Employment Division, Department of Human
Resources of Oregon v. Smith 97 which signaled a sharp break from the Court's
earlier willingness to consider religious exemptions from generally applicable
laws. Smith was employed as a drug counselor at a private drug rehabilitation
facility.' 98 He was fired for consuming peyote, a narcotic, at a religious
ceremony. Because he lost his job for "good reason," the Employment
Division Department denied the payment of unemployment benefits." The
Supreme Court upheld the denial on the ground that, by using peyote, he had
violated a generally applicable criminal law. His dismissal from the job
directly resulted from his consumption of the drug. Because this criminal law
was constitutional, it was also "consistent with the Free Exercise Clause" to
deny the unemployment compensation.2" The Court held that the government
may grant such an exemption from a generally applicable criminal law, but the
government is not required to do so.2"1 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority,
began with a summary of previous Free Exercise Clause cases. From these
cases he developed two major principles to be applied in deciding Free
Exercise Clause cases: (1) Government is not allowed to regulate religious
belief and (2) a religiously neutral law would violate the Free Exercise Clause
if the infringement on the free exercise right was intended by the
government.2°2
The respondents argued that according to the balancing test first applied in
Sherbert v. Verner,2 3 the Court must balance the interests of society and the
interests of the individual in order to resolve the case. The majority found the
"g Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 420.
,9 See Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n ofFlorida, 480 U.S. 136 (1987) (holding
that there must be an exception from the general denial of unemployment benefits if the person
loses hisjob because of his refusal to work on Saturdays); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707
(1981) (granting unemployment benefits to a person who for religious reasons had quit ajob in
a factory making parts for tanks and other weapons).
'97 494 U.S. 872 (1990). In Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith,
485 U.S. 660, 674 '(1988), the Court remanded the case to the Supreme Court of Oregon to
decide whether there was an exemption from the criminal law that would have allowed drug
consumption for sacramental purposes. The Supreme Court of Oregon decided that there was
no exemption. See 307 Ore. 68, 72-73, 763 P.2d 146, 148 (1988).
'"See Smith, 494 U.S. at 874.
'9 See id. at 874-75.
200 Id. at 890.
201 See id.
202 See id. at 877-78.
2w 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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Sherbert test inapplicable because it "was developed in a context that lent
itself to individualized government assessment of the reasons for the relevant
conduct."2 "' Further, this test was only applied in the context of the denial of
unemployment benefits because the dismissal was for "good cause." This
good cause standard created a "mechanism for individualized exemptions."'20 5
For dismissal from a job because of the violation of a criminal law, however,
the application of the Sherbert test would have fatal consequences for
subsequent cases: "To make an individual's obligation to obey such a law
contingent upon the law's coincidence with his religious beliefs, except where
the State's interest is 'compelling'-permitting him, by virtue of his beliefs,
'to become a law unto himself,'.. .- contradicts both constitutional tradition
and common sense."2°
The Court also distinguished its earlier discussion in Wisconsin v. Yoder,
207
in which the Court had given a religious exemption to Amish students from a
compulsory school attendance law. According to the Court in Smith, the
plaintiffs in Yoder based their claim not only on the Free Exercise Clause but
also on the "rights of parents to direct the religious upbringing of their
children." 2' These two rights together outweighed the government interest in
mandating further education after the eighth grade in Yoder. Because Smith
did not present such a "hybrid situation" but was solely based on a Free
Exercise claim, the Court did not consider Yoder to be binding precedent in
this case.2' Moreover, the Court concluded that it should not be in the
discretion of the judicial branch to determine either the compelling interest of
the society or the "centrality" of the religious belief in evaluating Free
Exercise claims to religious exemption. ° Such a determination should rather
be made in the political process. As stated by the court:
But to say that a nondiscriminatory religious-practice exemp-
tion is permitted, or even that it is desirable, is not to say that
it is constitutionally required, and that the appropriate
occasions for its creation can be discerned by the courts. It
may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political
process will place at a relative disadvantage those religious
2' Smith, 494 U.S. at 884.
20 Id. at 884.
206 Id. at 885 (footnote omitted).
"7 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
2m Id. at 233.
2o9 Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 875 (1990).
210 Id. at 887.
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practices that are not widely engaged in; but that unavoidable
consequence of democratic government must be preferred to
a system in which each conscience is a law unto itself or in
which judges weigh the social importance of all laws against
the centrality of all religious beliefs.21'
According to Smith, religiously neutral laws are only unconstitutional if the
challenger can prove the intent of the government to impinge on the free
exercise of religion. In response to this holding, in 1993 the United States
Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). 2 In brief,
the act was intended to restore the principle of strict scrutiny and the
compelling interest test, as applied in Sherbert and Yoder, to the full range of
Free Exercise cases.
In City of Boerne v. Flores the Court held, however, that RFRA exceeded
the legislative power and infringed on the powers of the judicial branch.2"3 As
the Court explained:
Congress' discretion is not unlimited, however, and the courts
retain the power, as they have since Marbury v. Madison, to
determine if Congress has exceeded its authority under the
Constitution. Broad as the power of Congress is under the
Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, RFRA
contradicts vital principles necessary to maintain separation
of powers and the federal balance.1 4
Thus today, a case challenging the constitutionality of a state law in light
of the Free Exercise Clause would be decided under the principles established
in Smith.
D. Function and Purpose of the Religion Clauses
The framers of the Constitution intended the two religion clauses to work
together in order to ensure complete religious autonomy. Nevertheless, there
are cases in which it is not possible to fulfill the command of non-establish-
ment and providing free exercise rights at the same time. If, for example,
211 Id. at 890.
212 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993,42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994).
213 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
214 Id. at 536.
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government grants exemptions from generally applicable laws for religious
reasons, it accommodates religion in a way that may also constitute an
establishment of religion at the same time. Hence, the two clauses sometimes
conflict. When the two clauses operate in this way the doctrines used by the
Court to determine the violation of one clause are also relevant for the
determination of a possible violation of the other clause.2"5 Sunday closing
laws, for example, were challenged on the grounds that they violated both
religion clauses. 26 The government's selection of Sunday as a uniform day of
rest was challenged as a violation of the Establishment Clause, and a Free
Exercise Clause violation was claimed by business owners who, due to their
religious beliefs, were forced to close their business an additional day, thereby
suffering an economic loss. The Court, however, concluded that the secular
purpose behind the statute, namely the establishment of a uniform day of rest,
was sufficient to justify the laws under both clauses. '17
Potential conflicts between the two religion clauses abound. A federal
statute providing chaplains for the armed forces seems clearly to threaten an
establishment of religion by the federal government, but the refusal to provide
such chaplains would most likely violate the Free Exercise Clause.2 8 In such
cases arguments that justify government action under the Free Exercise Clause
frequently are the same that justify the Establishment Clause violation.
Because people should have the opportunity to exercise their religion even
when they are in the armed forces, a chaplain should be provided. Yet the
payment of these chaplains with federal funds would violate the taxpayer's
right that the government not establish religion. Hence, the only possible
solution in these cases, according to the Court, is to balance the competing
values against each other in order "to find a neutral course between the two
Religion Clauses, both of which are cast in absolute terms, and either of which,
if expanded to a logical extreme, would tend to clash with the other."2 9
21 See TRME, supra note 5, § 14-2, at 1157.
216 See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420
(1961).
217 See Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 605-08.
218 Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 307 U.S. 203, 309 (1963) (Stewart, J., dissenting)
(stating that the refusal to provide a chaplain might violate the Free Exercise Clause).
219 Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970).
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III. CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF THE FREEDOM
OF RELIGION IN GERMANY
A. Overview
1. The Relationship Between Church and State. In contrast to the framers
of the United States Constitution, the Parliamentary Council, which drafted the
Basic Law, did not intend a strict separation between church and state.
Instead, the Parliamentary Council wanted to give religion a "special role in
the Nation's public life."' 20 Hence, the relationship between church and state
in Germany is a compromise between separation and connection that can best
be described as "limping separation."22'
Although church and state are basically independent from each other,' the
state grants some privileges to religious communities, which necessarily leads
to a cooperation between church and state in some areas.23 All religious
communities, for instance, are eligible for certain state subsidies, and they can
organize themselves as corporations under civil law.'24 In addition, the Basic
Law states that some religious holidays are official national holidays.22'5 The
main churches,226 which have the status of corporate bodies under public law,
are even allowed to levy taxes upon their members.227  Because of the
cooperative relationship between state and church, the churches do not need
to collect the taxes themselves. Instead, the Federal Government collects the
church taxes together with the income tax and then transfers the former to the
churches. " s Other areas in which church and state cooperate closely involve
the compulsory religious education in public schools, which has to be paid for
220 DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC
OF GERMANY 503 (1989).
221 THEODORMAUNZ &REINHOLD ZIPPELIUS, DEUTSCHES STAATSRECHT 237 (30th ed. 1998)
(using the German term "hinkende Trennung").
222 See GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution] [GG] art. 140; WEIMARER REICHSVERFASSUNG
[Constitution of 1919] [WRV] art. 137 (1) ("There shall be no state church.").
223 See MAUNZ & ZIPPELIUS, supra note 221, at 237-38.
224 See GG art. 140; WRV arts. 137(3), (5), 138.
225 See GG art. 140; WRV art. 139.
" The main churches in Germany today are the EvangelischeKirche Deutschlands (German
Evangelical Church) and the Katholische Kirche Deutschlands (German Catholic Church).
227 See GG art. 140; WRV art. 137(6).
22 See Johannes Rux, Bekenninisfreiheit in der Schule, DER STAAT 523, 525 (1996).
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by the state,229 and the right of the church to decide which professors should
be hired to teach theology at public universities. 23
In exchange for these privileges, the state has the right of supervision and
control over the religious community within the framework of existing
legislation."3 Religious communities are, however, allowed to regulate and
administer church affairs independently without government interference.
They can enact binding regulations or guidelines concerning, for example, the
time and place of religious exercise, the qualifications and vocational training
of their employees, as well as the hierarchy among religious officials. The
state may supervise actions only outside of this area of internal church affairs.
In addition, the Federal Constitutional Court 2 has given the term "internal
church affairs" a very broad meaning.23 As a result, the right of control and
supervision of the state has become more limited over the years.' Thus,
under current law, the state may require a new church building to comply with
general building and fire protection regulations and insist that church
employees not work more hours than the employment law allows them to
work; the state may not, however, question the decision of a religious
community concerning the employment or dismissal of employees. 5
Early on, the Federal Constitutional Court held that, outside constitutionally
specified areas of cooperation, the government had to be neutral not only
toward religion but also toward all kinds of ideologies. ' 6 By analyzing the
structure and content of all provisions of the Basic Law dealing with religion,
the Court found that, in particular, article 3(3), which requires equal treatment
for people of different religious beliefs, and article 4, which provides for
freedom of religion in general, support the conclusion that the state has to (1)
'29 See GG art. 7(3).
' See Rux, supra note 228, at 525.
231 See MAUNZ&Z IPELIUS, supra note 221, at 237 (explaining the rights of supervision and
control).
232 In Germany the Federal Constitutional Court is called the Bundeverfassungsgericht.
13 See Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [Federal Constitutional Court]
[BVerfGE] 18, 385 (386); BVerfGE 19, 78 (133).
234 See MAUNZ & ZIPPELIUS, supra note 221, at 238.
235 See id. at 238-39 (providing further examples for internal church affairs and state's right
of supervision.).
236 See BVerfGE 12, 1 (4); BVerfGE 18, 385 (386); BVerfGE 19, 206 (216); BVerfGE 24,
236 (246). In all these cases the Court stressed the need for neutrality toward every ideology.
This principle of neutrality, the so called weltanschauliche Neutralitat, was derived from an
analysis of the structure and the content of all constitutional provisions dealing with religion.
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tolerate religion and religious belief (principle of tolerance) 21 7 and (2) treat all
people equally regardless of their religious or ideological beliefs (principle of
equal treatment of religion). 8 As a result, the government may not, for
instance, provide subsidies or other financial contributions to one religion
without giving the same to the others."9
The principle of neutrality toward religion also prohibits the state from
identifying itself with certain religious beliefs or displaying religious symbols
in state buildings as a sign of identification with a particular religion.
Nevertheless, one can still find governmental reference to religion in German
public life. Some examples are the display of a cross in each German
courtroom and the phrase "So help me God" in the oath for public offices.
These governmental references to the Christian religion, however, do not
violate the principle of neutrality. Because of their longstanding tradition in
German public life, they are not considered as governmental identification
with religion but merely as a reference to the important role the Christian
religion has played in the historical and cultural development of Germany.2'
When the religious oath or the display of the religious symbol conflicts with
the freedom of religion of an individual, the latter prevails. People who are
eligible for public office are not required to include the religious affirmation
in their oath, and if somebody objects to the cross in the courtroom it has to be
removed.24
The state and church, therefore, are basically separated, but by granting
some privileges to religious communities the state favors religious communi-
ties more than secular organizations. With respect to these privileges, there is
a necessary connection between church and state, which makes cooperation
between church and state in some areas inevitable. Aside from these areas of
cooperation, however, the government has to be neutral toward religion in the
sense that it tolerates religion and religious beliefs and does not favor one
religion over another.
"' See Ulrich Scheuner, Die Religionsfreiheit im Grundgesetz, 67 DIE OFFENTLICHE
VERWALTUNG 585, 592 (1966) [herinafter DOV] (using the German term Toleranzgebot).
238 See BVerfGE 19,206 (216); see also THEODORMAUNZ& GONTHERDORIG,KOMMENTAR
ZUM GRUNDGESETZ art. 140, at 23 (1998) (citing further provisions of the Basic Law to explain
the principle of neutrality).
239 See MAUNZ & ZIPPELIUS, supra note 221, at 241.
240 See PETER SCHADE, GRUNDGESETZ MIT KOMMENTIERUNGEN 239 (4th ed. 1997).
' See, e.g., BVerfGE 35, 375 (holding that a cross must be temporarily removed from the
courtroom because a Jewish person objected to litigating under the cross).
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2. Overview of the Constitutional Provisions Dealing with Religion. The
German Grundgesetz (Basic Law) 242 has a more complex system of provisions
protecting religious freedoms than the United States Constitution. Aside from
article 4, the Free Exercise provision of the Basic Law, article 140 incorporates
five articles of the old Weimar Constitution of 1919,243 which deal with
religion and religious communities, into the Basic Law. In order to understand
this strange and unusual incorporation of old constitutional law into the new
constitutional law, it is necessary to look at the drafting and enacting history
of the Basic Law.2' The Basic Law was drafted by the Parliamentary Council
on the island of Herrenchiemsee. While all agreed that freedom of religion
should be set forth as a fundamental right, there was much dispute over how
to shape the relationship between church and state. The main churches wanted
a regulation of this relationship aside from article 4 of the Basic Law. The
political parties, on the other hand, did not want to regulate this relationship
in detail because of its complexity. This conflict ended with a compromise
decision simply to incorporate some provisions of the old Constitution of 1919
into the Basic Law. 45
In addition to these provisions, several other articles of the Basic Law,
"prohibiting discrimination based on religious belief,',2" can be found
throughout the Basic Law. Examples include articles 3(3), 33(3), and 7.
Article 3(3) provides for equal treatment of all people regardless of their
religious beliefs.247 Article 33 guarantees this equal protection, especially for
242 The term Grundgesetz or Basic Law stems from the fact that it was originally considered
to be only a provisionary constitution. See KOMMERS, supra note 220, at 35. Kommers writes
that "[u]nder the circumstances of a divided nation, the founders decided, pending Germany's
reunification, to write a basic law instead of a constitution. A constitution in the German
understanding of the term is a framework for the permanent organization of a particular nation-
state." See id. (footnote omitted) (emphasis omitted). Although Germany is now reunited,
neither the Grundgesetz itself nor its name has been replaced. As it has proved so useful over
all the years, instead of making a new constitution, the new "Lnder" have simply been added
to the preamble of the Basic Law. See generally MAUNZ & ZIPPELIUS, supra note 221, at 4-16
(providing an overview of the constitutional history of Germany).
243 The Weimar Constitution, enacted on August 11, 1919, was the constitution of the
German Reich. This constitution was replaced by the Grundgesetz in 1949.
244 See Rudolf Smend, Staat und Kirche nach dem Bonner Grundgesetz, 1 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR
EVANGELISCHES KIRCHENRECHT 1, 11-15 (1951) [hereinafter ZEvKR] (providing further
information about the enactment process of the Basic Law).
24 For a more detailed historical analysis, see Axel Freiherr von Campenhausen, § 136
Religionsfreiheit. in HANDBUCH DES STAATSRECHTS DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 384
(Josef Isensee & Paul Kirchhofeds., 1989).
24 KOMMERS, supra note 220, at 445.
247 See GG art. 3(3).
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public office or civil service, by stating that "the enjoyment of civil rights,
eligibility for public office, and rights acquired in the public service shall not
depend on a person's religious denomination."24 Paragraphs (2) and (3) of
article 7 deal with religious instruction in public schools.2"9 Finally, there are
several provisions that permit persons elected for public offices to swear the
oath of office "without a religious affirmation."25
B. Article 4 of the Basic Law
1. Overview. Article 4 can be seen as the core provision guaranteeing the
free exercise of religion.25' The religious rights granted are not connected to
citizenship, and, as a result, anyone, even a foreign citizen, can claim these
rights against all three branches of government. Moreover, article 4 is part of
the fundamental rights of the Basic Law.252 As a result, the amendment
process of article 4 is very difficult 253 and because of article 19(2) it is
impossible to infringe upon the essential basis of the rights provided by article
4. The first eighteen articles of the Basic Law contain the fundamental rights,
the so-called Grundrechte.254 These rights represent the "substantive values
of the Basic Law" and are therefore extremely important in the interpretation
of the Basic Law.255 In order to preserve the "substantive values of the Basic
Law" represented by these articles, article 19(2) declares that "[iun no case
may the essence of a basic right be encroached upon., 256 It is therefore
impossible for the German government to eliminate the rights and values that
are protected by the first eighteen articles. With regard to article 4, article
19(2) clearly prohibits the elimination of freedom of religion, the free exercise
right, and the rights of the conscientious objectors of article 4(3).257 In
addition, article 19(2) hinders the elimination of the principle of government
243 See GG art. 33(3).
249 See GG art. 7(2), (3).
250 See GG arts. 56, 64(2), 140 in connection with WRV art. 136 (4).
25 See GG art. 4.
252 See GG arts. 1-18.
25 See GG art. 79. This section regulates the amendment process. According to paragraph
two, an amendment must be carried by two thirds of the members of the Bundestag and two
thirds of the votes of the Bundesrat. See id. art. 79(2).
2 See KOMMERS, supra note 220, at 37 (referring to these fundamental rights as the Bill of
Rights).
'5- Id.; see also BVerfGE 6, 40 (holding that the Basic Law constitutes an objective order of
values). For an analysis of this case in English, see KOMMERS, supra note 220, at 324.
216 GG art. 19(2) ("In no case may the essence of a basic right be encroached upon.").
2 See BODO PIEROTH & BERNHARD SCHLiNK, GRUNDRECHTE 76-77 (9th ed. 1993).
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neutrality toward religion because it is derived from an interpretation of
different basic rights and thus also reflects a "substantive value of the Basic
Law."2
58
Article 4 itself is divided into three paragraphs, each of them protecting a
different aspect of religion. While the first paragraph deals with the freedom
of faith and conscience, the second paragraph provides the right of undisturbed
practice of religion. The third paragraph deals with conscientious objection
to military service, declaring that "no one may be compelled against his
conscience to perform service in war involving the use of arms."259 This
constitutional protection for conscientious objectors is unique in the world.'
2. Restrictions on the Freedoms ofArticle 4. Unlike many other constitu-
tional provisions, article 4 contains neither a reservation clause26' nor any other
restriction. That does not mean, however, that the protections of article 4 are
unlimited. Early in the history of the Federal Republic, the Federal Constitu-
tional Court held that conflicting fundamental rights of others may limit the
freedoms provided by article 4.262 This reasoning is based on the theory that
the Basic Law constitutes an "objective order of values,""2 3 which was
developed by the Court in the Elfes case2" in 1951. According to Elfes, the
Basic Law is not an accumulation of constitutional provisions but is rather an
expression of the "basic value choices of the framers. 265 Consequently, an
interpretation of one provision of the Basic Law must always take into account
the structure and intent of the Basic Law as a complete document. "[E]ach
constitutional clause is in a definite relationship with all other clauses, and...
together they form an entity."t26 By applying this theory to article 4, the court
has concluded that the framers did not consider article 4 to be more important
25 Rux, supra note 228, at 550 n.121.
2'9 GG art. 4(3).
260 See KOMMERS, supra note 220, at 462. Because this provision is not relevant for this
paper, I will refrain from further examination. For more information about article 4(3), see id.
"' A reservation clause is a clause in the article itself that allows government to regulate or
restrict the constitutional freedom provided by this article. See, e.g., GG art. 12(1) ("The
practice of an occupation or profession may be regulated by or pursuant to a law.").
262 See BVerfGE 28,243 (260-61). The German original reads as follows: "Nur kollidieren-
de Grundrechte Dritter und andere mit Verfassungsrang ausgestattete Rechtswerte sind mit
Rlcksicht auf die Einheit der Verfassung und die von ihr geschaitzte Wertordnung
ausnahmsweise imstande, auch uneischrankbare Grundrechte in einzelnen Beziehungen zu
begrenzen." Id.
'2 This is the term Professor Kommers uses for the German expression objektive
Werteordnung des Grundgesetzes. See KOMMERS, supra note 220, at 55.
2" See BVerfGE 6, 40.
KoMMERS, supra note 220, at 56.
I d. at 53 (citing Justice Leibholz) (emphasis and footnote omitted).
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than the other fundamental rights, such as the right of free speech267 or the
freedom of action.26
In cases where other constitutional rights conflict with the exercise of the
freedoms contained in article 4, the Court must use a balancing test to weigh
which right takes precedence. In deciding whether a church could be required
to refrain from ringing its bells on Sunday morning, the Court has to balance
the religious community's right of free exercise against the right of personal
freedom of other people living next to the church who are disturbed by the
noise.2"9 The Court is limited in its discretion in balancing conflicting
constitutional rights in that neither of the rights in question may encroach on
the "core essence" or "basic value" of other constitutional rights.270 In the
above-mentioned example, the Court found an acceptable solution by allowing
churches to ring their bells for religious reasons at any time, whereas ringing
of the bells for secular reasons (i.e., to tell the time) could be regulated by
law.27' In making such a distinction, the Court ensured that, on one hand, the
free exercise right was guaranteed and that, on the other hand, the private
freedom rights of the church neighbors were also not unduly burdened. 272 The
Court would have encroached upon the "core essence" of the right of private
freedom had it granted churches the unregulated right to ring their bells at any
time because such a holding would have completely ignored the right of
personal freedom.
In summary, although the wording of article 4 provides no explicit
restrictions, freedom of religion may be limited by other conflicting basic
rights. In order to decide such conflicts between fundamental rights, the Court
must weigh and balance the affected rights against each other.
3. Article 4(1). The first paragraph of article 4 enumerates different kinds
of freedom: the freedom of faith, the freedom of conscience, the freedom of
religious creed, and the freedom of ideological creed. The reason for this
unusual and seemingly strange enumeration can be found in the historical
267 See GG art. 5.
u See GG art. 2(l).
2 See Entscheidungen des Bundesverwaltungsgericht [Highest Administrative Court]
[BVerwGE] 86, 62.
270 BVerfGE 28, 243 (261). The German original reads as follows: "Dabei aufiretende
Konflikte lassen sich nur 16sen, indem ermittelt wird, welche Verfassungsbestimmung fir die
konkret zu entscheidende Frage das h6here Gewicht hat. Die schwlichere Norm darfnur so weit
zur~ickgedrangt werden, wie das logisch und systematisch zwingend erscheint; ihr sachlicher
Grundwertgehalt muB in jedem Fall respektiert werden." Id. (citation omitted).
271 See BverwGE 86, 62.
272 See id.
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development of the freedom of religion. While these freedoms are all
protected today by the freedom of religion, historically there was a difference
in the protection of these rights until the enactment of the Weimar Constitution
in 1919.
In the 16th and 17th centuries, only the Catholic and Lutheran creeds were
considered under law to be religious beliefs. However, religious freedom even
for these two churches did not in fact exist. At that time, religious beliefs of
the populace were determined by their sovereign under the principle cuius
regio-eius religio, a Latin expression meaning that the person who reigns
determines the religion of his servants."' Moreover, the sovereign had not
only the power to establish the official religion but also the power to prohibit
all other religions and sects and to expel their followers (ius reprobandi),7 4
As a result, religious persecution was very common during that time.
At the end of the 18th century, this viewpoint began to change. Following
adoption of the Virginia Bill of Rights in 1776 and the French Revolution in
1789, many German states recognized freedom of religion in their constitu-
tions. 275 Freedom of religion, however, was still only granted to the two main
churches and not to other religions and ideologies. This disparate treatment
of religions was finally overcome by the enactment of the Weimar Constitu-
tion in 1919. For the first time in Germany, freedom of religion was
guaranteed to adherents of all religions. Article 135 guaranteed the freedom
of faith, conscience, and creed to every citizen of the German Reich.7 6
Unfortunately, unlimited fieedom of religion was only temporary. With
Hitler's seizure of power in 1933, freedom of religion was again limited to its
"very narrowest essence. 27 Under the pretense of fostering a national
Christian religion, the Nazis interpreted the term "religion" in a very narrow
sense, stipulating that it only embraced those religious beliefs closely related
to National Socialism. Although the Weimar Constitution was still technically
valid under the Nazi regime, article 135 was soon displaced and superseded by
273 See MARTIN HECKEL, DEUTSCHLAND IM KONFESSIONELLEN ZEITALTER 33 (1983).
2 Of course, the sovereign could also tolerate other religions (ius tolerandi) or allow people
with different beliefs to emigrate (ius emigrandi). However, not many sovereigns, and especially
not those who were Catholics, used these two possibilities. See Martin Heckel, Ius Reformandi,
in EVANGESLISCHE STAATSRECHTLEHRE 11, 1415 [hereinafter EVSTL].
275 See von Campenhausen, supra note 245, at 384.
276 WRV art. 135(1).
277 von Campenhausen, supra note 245, at 389. The German original reads as follows:
"SpAtestens seit 1936 war die Kirchenpolitik ganz auf die Einschrlnkung des Grundrechts auf
einen innersten Kern ausgerichtet." Id.
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new regulations and laws. Under the pretense that the government and
public life in general should be freed from religious interference, the Nazis
narrowed the freedom of faith and conscience to protect only Protestants and
Catholics and placed severe restraints on the belief in and the free exercise of
all other religions.
The seemingly strange collection of different rights in article 4(1) is
therefore the result of a strong reaction against the restraints on the freedom
of religion under the Nazi regime.279 The post-war framers of the Basic Law
sought to eliminate the possibility that the government could formally
recognize freedom of religion but then limit some forms of religious beliefs or
expression by giving the term "freedom of religion" a very narrow meaning.
They relied upon cumbersome constitutional language in order to ensure the
permanence of fundamental rights.
Thus, the enumeration of different freedoms of belief in article
4(l)-originally intended to clarify the protections that had become distorted
in the time of National Socialism-today has no importance in constitutional
interpretation. The Federal Constitutional Court currently considers the
different freedoms to be synonymous with one another.8 For example,
instead of using the term freedom of faith, the Court uses the term freedom of
creed.2"1
The freedom of faith and creed, the basis of religious freedom,'28 2 is
expressly protected by the first paragraph of article 4. This provision protects
not only the freedom to have a certain distinct belief but also the freedom to
hold no religious belief at all. According to the Federal Constitutional Court,
it does not matter if the non-believer is indifferent to all religious creeds, does
not want to think about it, or simply has not made up his or her mind with
respect to religious matters. 3 Moreover, article 4 not only protects religious
belief or non-belief but also protects the freedom of ideological creed. Thus,
Marxism, for example, is protected by article 4, even though it has no religious
'2 The freedom of religion under article 135 was one of the constitutional rights that could
not be suspended, by the President of the Reich, in case of an emergency. Thus, whether article
135 was still valid under National Socialism is frequently questioned today. See JORG WINTER,
DE WISSENSCHAFT VOM STAATSKIRCHENRECHT M DarrrEN REICH 29 (1979); von
Campenhausen, supra note 245, at 388-89.
279 See BVerfGE 24, 236 (245).
"o See von Campenhausen, supra note 245, at 392.
21 See BVerfGE 12, 1 (4); see also von Campenhausen, supra note 245, at 392 n.105
(providing further examples).
28 See von Campenhausen, supra note 245, at 395 (stating that the freedom of faith and creed
is the centerpiece of the freedom of religion).
213 See MAuNz & DORIG, supra note 238, art. 4, at 23.
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content at all.2 ' This rule blocks the persecution of people both on the basis
of their ideological creed and their religion.
The interpretation of freedom of faith and creed in article 4(1) is extensive,
protecting almost every kind of belief or non-belief.2"' As a result, when
referring to the freedom of faith and creed protected by article 4(1), the
Federal Constitutional Court often uses the term forum internum, which
denotes the whole internal system of thought concerning faith and creed.'
The protection of the forum internum is absolute, and government cannot
infringe upon it in any way. 7
4. Article 4(2). The second paragraph of article 4 provides: "The
undisturbed practice of religion shall be guaranteed." 28 If taken literally, one
might conclude that only the free exercise of religion would be protected and
not the exercise of a non-religious belief. However, such a conclusion would
be incorrect. The theory behind the Basic Law as an "objective order of
values" requires not only the interpretation of one basic right in light of the
whole constitution but also the evaluation of one single paragraph with respect
to the rest of the article. Thus, one must read the second paragraph in
connection with the first. There would be no true freedom of faith or creed if
the constitution did not also protect the possibility of refusing to lead a life
according to a faith or creed.289 In fact, the Federal Constitutional Court has
never made a distinction between religious and non-religious practice.'l As
a result, living in a kolkhoz, or a collective farm, would be protected under
article 4 as free exercise and practice of an ideological belief. The Federal
Constitutional Court has even found the right of free exercise to be guaranteed
not only by article 4(2) but also by article 4(1).29' Although article 4(1) speaks
only of freedom of faith, conscience, and creed, it also must logically
'" See von Campenhausen, supra note 245, at 396.
2" Problems in this area arise mainly with new sects. Freedom of faith does not protect any
opinion but only those based on religious, ethical, or metaphysical grounds. In determining
whether a certain belief fulfills these criteria, the government has to apply the criteria neutrally,
without judging the content or the dogmas of the belief. See von Campenhausen, supra note
245, at 396.
'" See MAUNZ & DORIG, supra note 238, art. 4, at 27; von Campenhausen, supra note 241,
at 395; PIEROTH & SCHLNK, supra note 257, at 133.
287 See von Campenhausen, supra note 245, at 395 (stating that this freedom is unlimited);
BVerfGE 17, 302 (305).
288 GG art. 4(2).
229 See von Campenhausen, supra note 245, at 401.
290 See PIEROTH & SCHL1NK, supra note 257, at 133.
29 See BVerfGE 24, 236 (245) (stating that the free exercise right already exists in the
freedom to believe).
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incorporate the right to publicly declare this faith by religious exercise,
proselytizing, or propaganda. 292 As a consequence of this holding, the narrow
wording of article 4(2), with its reference only to the "practice of religion," has
now become irrelevant. The first paragraph in effect supersedes the second so
that the latter now only has a confirming and clarifying effect.
Free exercise is considered to be the right of every person to live in
compliance with his faith and to act according to his inner convictions. 293 This
right is guaranteed against the actions of all three branches of government.
The branches are not allowed to infringe upon the free exercise right without
good reason. For example, a court may not schedule a trial hearing for a
person of Jewish faith on a Jewish religious holiday,294 and the legislature may
not deny unemployment benefits to workers who refuse to work on their
religious holidays.295
However, in some limited circumstances, it may be necessary to limit the
free exercise right if it conflicts with the fundamental rights of others. The
fundamental rights system ensures that every person within the community has
the right to live and the right to self-fulfillment insofar as the exercise of these
rights does not violate the rights or interests of other citizens.2 Along these
lines, the Federal Constitutional Court has concluded that behavior that
questions essential principles of the legal community or the proper existence
of the legal community itself cannot be protected by the constitution.297
According to this principle, those religious practices that conflict with
criminal law or regulations enacted for the benefit of society as a whole are
292 See BVerfGE 12, 1 (3). The German original reads as follows: "Dieser Begriffrumfal3t
nArnlich - gleichgfiltig, ob es sich um ein religi6ses Bekenntnis oder eine religionsfremde oder
religionsfreie Weltanschauung handelt -nicht nur die innere Freiheit, zu glauben oder nicht zu
glauben . . . sondem ebenso die Freiheit des kultischen Handelns, des Werbens, der
Propaganda." Id.
293 See BVerfGE 32, 98 (106). The German original reads as follows: "[S]ein gesarntes
Verhalten an den Lehren seines Glaubens auszurichten und seiner inneren Glaubensfiberzeugung
gen zu handeln." Id.
29 See Bundesgerichtshof [Supreme Court] [BGH], in NEUSTE JURISTISCHE
WOCHENZEITSCHRIFT [NJW] 1959, 1330 (1330).
295 See Entscheidung des Bundessozialgerichtshofes [Supreme Social Insurance Court]
[BSGE] 51, 70 (73).
2" See von Campenhausen, supra note 245, at 405. The German original reads as follows:
"Sie sollen vielmehr innerhalb der Rechtsgemeinschaft dem einzelnen das Leben und die freie
Entfaltung seiner Pers6nlichkeit gewAhrleisten, unbeschadet entgegenstehender Interessen und
Standpunkte anderer Staatsbtirger." Id.
297 See BVerGE 33, 23 (29). The German original reads as follows: "Daher k6nnen
Verhaltensweisen die tragende Grundsitze der Rechtsgemeinschaft oder gar die
Rechtsgemeinschaft selbst in Frage stellen, keinen grundrechtlichen Schutz beanspruchen." Id.
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often restricted or completely proscribed. For example, in the 1970s some
people refused to pay their electricity bills as a means of protesting the
generation of atomic energy. Even though their refusal was based on
ideological beliefs, the Federal Constitutional Court did not find this practice
protected under article 4.29 Five years later, the Court reached the same
conclusion, rejecting claims by persons who refused to pay taxes and to make
other contributions on the basis of religious or ideological reasons. 299 The
Court concluded that allowing such a practice would endanger the whole social
system, which is based on the contributions of all citizens.3"
In some cases a person's free exercise right might conflict with the free
exercise rights of other people. This conflict can arise in two ways: in a
conflict involving people of different beliefs or in a conflict arising between
non-believers and believers. According to the Federal Constitutional Court,
in both types of conflicts courts must find a neutral solution by balancing the
competing rights against each other.3"' This result seems obvious in cases that
deal with a conflict involving people of different beliefs. If, for instance, a
public school teacher is teaching in his religious garb, the court must balance
his free exercise right against the competing religious freedom of the children
to receive a religion-neutral secular education. On the other hand, requiring
such a balancing process for conflicts involving believers and non-believers
might not, at first sight, seem to be a satisfying solution. One might conclude
that the free exercise right of non-believer gives him the right to be free from
exposure to any religious practice. This, however, is not the case. The free
exercise right of the non-believers goes as far as that of the believers. If
believers have the right to practice their religion, non-believers have the right
not to practice religion. But neither believers nor non-believers may insist that
others refrain from their religious practice.3 °2 In the School Prayer case,30 3 the
Federal Constitutional Court held that a student who did not want to participate
29 See Bundesverfassungsgericht [Federal Constitutional Court] [BVerfG], in NJW 1982,
32.
29 See BVerfGE 67,26 (37); Bundessozialgericht [Supreme Social Insurance Court] [BSG],
in NJW 1987, 702 (703).
See BVerfGE 67, 26 (39).
30' See BVerfGE 93, 15 (15); BVerfGE 41,29 (49); BVerfGE 41,65 (78); BVerfGE 44, 196
(199); BVerfGE 52, 223 (223).
'02 See MAUNZ & DORIG, supra note 238, art. 4, at 24; von Campenhausen, supra note 245,
at 427-28; PiEROTH & SCHLINK, supra note 257, at 135, 141.
303 See BVerfGE 52, 223. For a translation of this case, see KOMMERS, supra note 220, at
499-572.
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in a prayer contrary to his religious belief could not prevent his fellow students
from praying?°
5. Conclusion. Freedom of religion, according to article 4, means first of
all the freedom to choose to have, or to refrain from choosing or having, a
certain religious or non-religious faith. The definition of faith is extensive and
covers the whole spectrum of one's inner convictions, the so-called forum
internum. If a person's inner convictions have no direct effect on others, this
freedom of faith is protected absolutely under article 4 of the Basic Law.
Additionally, the freedom of religion provides the right of free exercise.
Contrary to the narrow wording of the second paragraph of article 4, this free
exercise right is guaranteed for every kind of belief, religious or ideological.
The free exercise right is not unlimited, however. This right can be subject to
regulation if a religious practice would either violate the fundamental rights
of other people or endanger the fundamental order of the German Constitution.
C. Article 140 of the Basic Law in Connection with Articles 136-139, 141 of
the Weimar Constitution
Article 140 of the Basic Law states: "[T]he provisions of Articles 136, 137,
138, 139 and 141 of the German Constitution of 11 August 1919 shall be an
integral part of this Basic Law."3°5 Through this process of incorporation, five
provisions of the Weimar Constitution have become part of the Basic Law,
with the same rank as all other constitutional provisions of the Basic Law. 30,
The result is that these provisions must also be interpreted in light of the
"substantive values of the Basic Law., 307 Because all five provisions deal with
the relationship between church and state, courts frequently must interpret the
meaning of these provisions in connection with article 4. According to the
Federal Constitutional Court any conflicts arising between these five
constitutional provisions and article 4 should be solved by balancing the values
each provision will affect.308 Because articles 136-139 and 141 of the Weimar
Constitution are not directly relevant to the issue of religion in public schools,
the following paragraph will only briefly summarize these provisions.
Articles 136-139 and 141 of the Weimar Constitution mainly regulate the
relationship between church and state. They are comparable to the Establish-
' See BverfGE 52, 223 (251).
305 GG art. 140.
" See MAUNZ & DORIG, supra note 238, art. 140, at 6.
'07 See supra Part III.B. 1-2.
308 See JOSEPH LisTL, DAS GRUNDREcHT DER RELIGIONSFREIHEIT IN DER RECHTSPRECHUNG
DER GERICHTE DER BUNDES REPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 54, 354-56 (1971).
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ment Clause of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution,
although the relationship between church and state differs in the two
countries a.3 9 Article 136 concerns the protection of the individual's freedom
of religion. As these protections are already guaranteed by other Basic Law
provisions, such as articles 4 and 33(3), article 136 of the Weimar Constitution
is frequently viewed as having only a clarifying function.3 '0 Article 137 can
be seen as the most important of these five articles because it sets forth the
basic principles that govern the church-state relationship in Germany.3 ' The
first paragraph of article 137 prohibits the establishment of a state church,
whereas the other seven paragraphs regulate the relationship between church
and state in more detail and grant some privileges to religious communities."'
Articles 138 and 139 grant further privileges to religious communities
including the right to own property and the recognition of Christian holidays
as national holidays. 3 Finally, article 141 permits religious organizations to
provide religious services and pastoral work in the military, hospitals, prisons,
and other public institutions.a 4
IV. FREEDOM OF RELIGION IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
An exploration and discussion of every aspect of the relationship between
religion and public schools would exceed the scope of this paper. As a result,
the following discussion is limited to three particularly significant areas of
conflict: (1) the constitutionality of prayer in public schools, (2) the use of
religious symbols in public schools, and (3) the proper scope of the free
exercise rights of teachers in public schools. Before comparing cases in these
three areas, it is necessary to offer an overview of how both countries organize
their public school systems and then to contrast the roles that religion plays in
the public school systems of the United States and Germany.
'09 See supra Part III.A. 1.
310 See MAUNZ & DORIG, supra note 238, art. 140, at 33.
3" See GG art. 137.
3' For a more detailed explanation of the church-state relationship and the privileges of the
religious communities, see supra Part III.A. 1.
3 See GG art. 138(2), 139.
314 See GG art. 141.
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A. The Relationship Between Public Schools and Religion in General
1. Public Schools and Religion in the United States. Unlike the German
Basic Law,3" 5 the United States Constitution does not address the issue of
education. Additionally, the Supreme Court has held that education is not a
fundamental right that must be provided by the federal government" As a
result, education is a matter left primarily to the discretion of the states. All
state constitutions include clauses providing for education.3t7 Some state
constitutions are very general on this matter, while others are more specific.
However, all of them have incorporated at least two fundamental aspects: (1)
public school education is made available free of charge and (2) there are
virtually no limitations on access to public schools.3"' Aside from certain areas
in which federal legislation preempts the states' legislative power, it is the
state legislature that establishes rules for employment, curriculum, and exam
regulation in public schools.31 9 Because it would be almost impossible for the
state to regulate its entire public school system to the smallest detail, the states
have delegated this power to the local school boards. In order to implement
the general regulations that the states have set, local school boards adopt
policies, rules, and regulations having the force of law.320
In the United States the relationship between church and state is primarily
governed by the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, which requires
government neutrality toward religion. The basic principle of separation
between church and state also governs the relationship between religion and
public schools. Any introduction of religion into a public school is considered
unconstitutional when it constitutes an establishment of religion by the school
authorities. Hence, a state statute prescribing religious instruction in public
schools would be unconstitutional.32' Similarly, a state may not ban the
313 See infra Part IV.A.2.
316 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
317 See MICHAEL W. LA MORTE, SCHOOL LAW, CASES AND CONCEPTS 11 (6th ed. 1998).
311 See id. at 81-84. For cases providing an overview of states' constitutional provisions and
cases that deal with the issue of school fees, see Hartzell v. Connell, 679 P.2d 35 (Cal. 1984);
Paulson v. Minidoka County Sch. Dist. No. 331, 463 P.2d 935, 938 (Idaho 1970); Cardiff v.
Bismarck Pub. Sch. Dist., 263 N.W.2d 105 (N.D. 1978).
319 See LA MORTE, supra note 317, at 12.
320 See id. at 13.
32' Compare Illinois ex. rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (holding that
religious instruction in public schools under a released time agreement by private teachers is
unconstitutional under the First Amendment), with Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952)
(upholding a released time program in which the students received religious instruction outside
the school property).
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teaching of the theory of evolution from the biology curriculum322 or try to
"compensate" for the teaching of the theory of evolution by requiring
simultaneous teaching of creationism because such choices inject religious
doctrines into the curriculum.32
Religion must therefore be separated from the public school system to the
same degree as it is from the state in general. The wall of separation between
church and state prohibits not only religious instruction in public schools but
also prohibits any religious belief from being advanced or disfavored by the
school. However, there are exceptions to this rule of strict separation,
including the combination of religious holidays with school holidays.
Christmas and Thanksgiving are generally seen as both religious holidays and
national holidays based on historical American traditions.324 Thus, the state
can declare school holidays on these occasions. On the other hand, Good
Friday, a Christian religious holiday, has no such secular connotation
according to at least one court.32 A state statute declaring Good Friday to be
an official school holiday could therefore constitute a violation of the
Establishment Clause.326
2. Public Schools and Religion in Germany. Secondary education in
Germany comes in diverse forms and has been fairly characterized as
multidimensional and complex. 27 States, municipalities, religious organiza-
tions, and even private individuals can create or open new schools as long as
the founding entity takes on legal responsibility for the school. Hence, there
are many different types of schools from which students can choose.
Ersatzschulen, Rudolf-Steiner-Schulen, Waldorffschulen, and vocational
schools provide just a few examples.328 The reason for this diversity of school
322 See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (invalidating a statute that prohibited both
the teaching of evolution and the use of textbooks suggesting that "mankind ascended or
descended from a lower order of animal").
323 See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (invalidating a Louisiana statute requiring
that the teaching of evolution must be accompanied by teaching of creation science because it
clearly advanced a religious doctrine).
31 See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 674-75 (1984) (describing the process by
which Thanksgiving became a national holiday over a century ago).
3,. See Metzl v. Leininger, 850 F. Supp. 740 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
326 See id. at 750 (stating that a statute requiring Good Friday to be one of the twelve official
school holidays would be unconstitutional).
327 See MAUNZ&DORIG, supra note 238, art. 7, at 13.
3 Ersatzschulen are private schools that may replace the public schools. Rudolf-Steiner-
Schulen are schools that were founded by the theosophist Rudolph Steiner. Waldorffschulen
base their curriculum mainly on arts and science. Unlike many other schools, the
Waldorffschule does not grade its pupils.
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types lies not only in the historical development of the school system in
Germany329 but also in the fact that most of the legislative power to regulate
the public school system is delegated to the Lander, the German equivalent to
the United States state.330 Aside from certain limitations, Lander are, in
principle, free to regulate the school system within their territories. Lander
have the right to establish and even to eliminate certain schools. Lander may
choose where and what type of school has to be established"' and may also
define the curriculum and exam regulations. This extensive regulatory power
is limited only by article 7 of the Basic Law, which provides certain guidelines
that Lander must take into account.
In six paragraphs,332 article 7 of the Basic Law sets forth the constitutional
principles for the school system in Germany. Beyond the requirements
imposed by article 7, the Lander are free to provide a more detailed framework
for the school system in their territory. As in the United States, the Lander
delegate regulatory power for final details to administrative bodies. These
administrative bodies are free to perform their tasks according to their own
administrative guidelines with the exception of certain limitations discussed
below.
The first paragraph of article 7 restricts the general autonomy of the school
administration by stating that "[t]he entire school system shall be under the
supervision of the state."333 Because private schools are also a part of the
comprehensive school system of Germany, they are subject to state supervi-
sion. This state supervision, however, is more limited than the supervision of
the public schools because article 7(3) grants the private schools certain
regulatory freedoms.33" The Federal Constitutional Court has given article 7(1)
a very broad meaning by holding that article 7(1) also gives the states the right
to regulate certain educational issues on a statewide or even on a nationwide
329 See MAUNZ & DORIG, supra note 238, art. 7, at 13 (stating that the diversity in the school
system is based on historical, ideological, pedagogical, and sociological reasons).
330 See GG art. 70(1). According to this article, "The Lander have the right to legislate in so
far as this Basic Law does not confer legislative powers on the Federation." See id. Concerning
the area of education and schools, the legislative powers are not conferred on the Federation and
therefore remain with the Lander.
33 Public schools can be established as denominational, inter-demoninational, or as non-
denominational schools.
332 As only the first three paragraphs are dealing with public schools, the overview will be
restricted to those paragraphs. For a further analysis of article 7, see MAUNZ & DORIG, supra
note 238, art. 7, at 47-53.
" See GG art. 7(1).
33 See MAUNZ & DORIG, supra note 238, art. 7, at 17-22 (providing details for the graded
supervision according to the type of school).
2000]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
basis.335 According to the Court, article 7(1) gives the states the regulatory
power to organize and structure the school system in a centralized way in order
to assure that all students can receive the kind of education that best reflects
their abilities. Basic regulations are thus established at a state level and
include, for example, the determination of the curriculum and the identifica-
tion of compulsory subjects. States also determine whether a school may be
established, significantly changed, or eliminated.336
Article 7(3) provides that "[r]eligious instruction shall form part of the
curriculum in state schools except non-denominational [state] schools. 337
Non-denominational state schools are public schools that are neutral toward
all religious denominations in the sense that they neither provide religious
instruction nor show any affiliation to a religious sect.338 Non-denominational
public schools, however, are extremely rare in Germany, and only a few
Lander have established their entire public school system on a non-denomina-
tional basis.3 9 Another type of public school is the public denominational
school. Unlike the United States, the German Ldnder may establish denomina-
tional public schools in which the education in all subjects is closely linked to
a certain religious belief.3 °  Although the constitutionality of the state
established religiously affiliated schools is unquestioned in Germany, 
34
denominational public schools are very rare today. In Bavaria, for instance,
5 See BVerfGE 26, 222.
336 See BVerfGE 26, 222, 228. The German original reads as follows: "Zur staatlichen
Aufsicht fiber fiber die Schulen gehbrt die Befugnis des Staates zur zentralen Ordnung und
Organisation des Schulwesens mit dem Ziel, ein Schulsystem zu gewahrleisten, das allenjungen
Burgern gemAB ihren FRihigkeiten die dem heutigen gesellschaftlichen Leben entsprechenden
Bildungsmoglichkeiten er6ffnet. Dem Staat steht die Schulplanung und die M6glichkeit der
Einwirkung auf Errichtung und Aufhebung der einzelnen 6ffentlichen Schulen zu." Id.
117 See GG art. 7(3).
331 Some non-denominational schools provide a general and neutral instruction in different
religious and ideological beliefs. This instruction, however, is not considered to be religious
instruction according to article 7(3) of the Basic Law. See MAUNZ & DORIG, supra note 238,
art. 141, at 11.
... Berlin and Bremen are two Lander that do not provide religious instruction in public
schools at all.
o See Fritz Ossenbilhl, Organisation des offentlichen Schulwesens, NJW 1375 (1976).
' Rux, supra note 228, at 528 (stating that the constitutionality of this school type is derived
from a historical interpretation of article 7(5) of the Basic Law). This provision allows the
establishment ofdenominational, non-denominational, or alternative private schools only when
no state school of that type exists locally. From the wording of this article, one can conclude
that the framers of the Basic Law wanted to allow a public denominational school. See id.; see
also Peter Badura, Das Kreuz im Klassenzimmer, in BAYRISCHES VERWALTUNGSBLATr 71, 73
(1996) [hereinafter BAYVBL].
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it was mandated by law that each public elementary school had to be
established as a denominational school. In 1967, however, the passage of a
referendum forced the Bavarian government to change most of the denomina-
tional schools into Christian inter-denominational schools, the third type of
public school that exists in Germany. 4 2 The Christian inter-denominational
school," 3 also called Gemeinschaftsschule, is the most common public school
type in Germany.' As with non-denominational public schools, Christian
inter-denominational schools are open for children of all religious beliefs.
Nevertheless, they differ from the non-denominational schools in the sense
that they are affiliated with the Christian faith and are constitutionally required
to provide religious instruction.
The religious affiliation with the Christian faith is obvious in the secular
school subjects because the teacher of such subjects in a Gemeinschaftsschule
may refer to the Christian faith as a main factor for the cultural and educa-
tional development in Germany." The development of the Lutheran-
Protestant religion and its effects on Germany's social development, for
example, is part of the regular curriculum in these inter-denominational
schools. Hence, the religious affiliation of the Gemeinschaftsschulen allows
them to place an emphasis on the Christian tradition and on the Christian faith,
whereas the non-denominational schools have to be neutral toward religion.
"Religious affiliation does not mean, however, that Gemeinschaftsschulen are
allowed to proselytize the pupils by setting the Christian faith as being
absolute. By doing so, the state, which maintains the public school system,
would violate the principle of neutrality toward religious beliefs set forth in
articles 4 and 140 of the Basic Law. Even an inter-denominational school like
the Gemeinschaftsschule is not allowed to influence the students toward a
certain religious belief outside the area of religious instruction. "[Thus], the
school may not be a missionary school and may not demand commitment to
32 See Rux, supra note 228, at 523, 525 n. 11.
3 See KOMMERS, supra note 220, at 473 (Professor Kommers translated the German
Gemeinschaflschule into "Christian inter-denominational schools").
3 See Christoph Link, Staat Crux?, NJW 3353, 3354 (1995) (stating this is the standard
public school type in Bavaria, Baden-Wartemberg, and North-Rhine/Westphalia).
s See id. at 3354. The German original reads as follows: "In der Sache heiilt das, daO in den
profanen Fachern der christliche Charakter in erster Linie durch die Anerkennung des
Christentums als prigender Kultur- und Bildungsfaktor bestimmt wird, wie er sich in der
abendlindischen Kultur herausgebildet hat." Id. (emphasis omitted); see also KOMMERS, supra
note 220, at 477 (citing a Federal Constitutional Court decision).
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Christian articles of faith. Also it must remain open to other ideological and
religious ideas and values.""
According to article 7(3), inter-denominational public schools are required
to provide religious instruction. Although the Gemeinschaftschulen are based
on the Christian faith, religious instruction in these schools is given not only
in the Christian faith but also in all other religious beliefs for which there are
enough students to form a class for religious instruction.347  Religious
instruction is to be taught according to the guiding principles of the particular
religious belief and by a certified teacher.' 8 All expenses and costs have to be
carried by the state.' 9 Moreover, the right of religious instruction is not
simply a simple constitutional statement but rather a guarantee for parents,
children, and religious communities that students will receive religious
instruction in every public school, except for non-denominational public
schools.
3 0
The right to receive religious instruction does not mandate that children
attend religious instruction contrary to their own religious belief. Paragraph
2 of article 7 grants parents and guardians the right "to decide whether children
receive religious instruction."35' This provision can be seen as lex specialis to
the general responsibility of article 6(2) of the parents for the "care and
upbringing of children. '352 According to the Gesetz iber religi6se
Kindererziehung, the law governing religious education for children, the
parents have the right to make the decisions concerning their child's participa-
tion in religious instruction until the child becomes fourteen years old.353 From
age fourteen on, the child can determine for herself whether she wants to
receive religious instruction. No reason for refusing to participate is required.
Until the summer of 1998, the main problem that arose in the context of article
7(2) was whether participation in ethics classes could be required for students
not participating in religious instruction or if article 7(2) also allowed the
parents, or the child, to object to participation in such classes. In the summer
m6 KOMMERS, supra note 220, at 477 (citing a decision of the German Constitutional Court).
3 See RolfSchieder, Zwangzum Unterricht in staatlicher Weltanschauung, SODDEUTSCHE
ZEITUNG, Apr. 16, 1996, at 3 (stating that as a result, many German public schools also offer
religious education for Muslim and Jewish children).
" See MAUNz & DORIG, supra note 238, art. 7, at 32-34.
39 See id. art. 7, at 33.
30 See id. art. 7, at 32 (providing further reference for this interpretation of article 7(3)).
"' See GG art. 7(2).
352 See GG art. 6(2).
33 See GESETZOBERRELIGIOSEKINDERERZEHUNG [Law Governing the Religious Education
of Children] [RELKERzG] § 5 Nr. 2.
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of 1998, the highest administrative court in Germany resolved this question by
holding that students who object to participation in religious instruction could
be required to participate in ethics classes instead.354 Arguing that article 7(1)
grants the state the power to regulate important school issues, the court
concluded that the state may not only regulate the content of the curriculum
and determine the compulsory subjects along traditional lines but also that the
state may establish completely new compulsory subjects, like an ethics class,
for students who do not participate in religious instruction. As long as ethics
is instructed in a religiously and ideologically neutral fashion, ethics can be a
compulsory subject in lieu of religious instruction.3"' The ethics curriculum
in almost every German Lander is defined as a general overview of the
different religious and non-religious beliefs and ideologies, and the teacher
chosen to teach ethics generally tends to be only minimally committed towards
a certain religious belief or ideology. Thus, the danger that ethics is taught in
a non-neutral fashion, favoring either a religious or an ideological belief, is as
minimal as it is for other secular subjects such as history or economics.
B. Prayer in School
1. School Prayer in the United States. In the United States the constitu-
tionality of prayer in public schools has always been controversial. Beginning
in the early 1960s, government composed prayers held at the beginning of each
school day, daily moments of silence, and non-denominational prayers at
graduation ceremonies were challenged in the courts. These challenges
produced several United States Supreme Court decisions, which will be
analyzed individually in the following sections of this paper.
Prior to the 1960s the daily morning prayer constituted the most common
form of religious practice in the public schools. 5 6 Daily morning prayers in
public schools existed even before the Civil War,357 but it was not until 1962
that the Supreme Court in Engel v. Vitale.. was faced with determining their
constitutionality. Engel, together with nine other parents, challenged a New
York statute, relied on by a local school district, that allowed a daily prayer in
public schools. At the beginning of each school day, every class had to recite
the following prayer composed by the State Board of Regents in order to
"s BVerwGE 6C1 1.97 (June 1998).
355 See id. at 15.
356 See WILLIAM E. GRFFITHS, RELIGION, THE COURTS, AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLs 1 (1966).
... See id. at 3 (referring to two cases in which the legality of these religious exercises in
public schools had been challenged).
358 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
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increase moral and spiritual training in public schools: 9 "Almighty God, we
acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us,
our parents, our teachers and our Country.""3W
The lower courts,"' as well s the New York Court of Appeals, 2 upheld
the statute and the school board's practice on the ground that the pupils were
not forced to join the prayer if they or their parents objected to it. The
Supreme Court, in contrast, found this option insufficient and concluded that
this "clearly religious activity" violated the Establishment Clause.163 Writing
for the majority, Justice Black relied on historical evidence to conclude that
"[t]he First Amendment... tried to put an end to government control of
religion and of prayer."' Because government power to regulate religion is
always accompanied by dangers of religious persecution, the framers of the
Constitution intended to erect a wall between the church and the state. As
"[t]here can be no doubt that New York's state prayer program officially
establishes the religious beliefs embodied in the Regents' prayer," the prayer
was unconstitutional despite its denominational neutrality and the opt-out
feature.3" Justice Black also rejected the respondents' argument that
invalidation of the prayer expressed an impermissible hostility toward
religion.367 In his view there was no hostility in saying "that each separate
government in this country should stay out of the business of writing or
sanctioning official prayers."'36 Instead, such an interpretation of the
Establishment Clause properly left the responsibility for religious exercises "to
the people themselves and to those the people choose to look to for religious
guidance. 369
The sole dissenter in Engel, Justice Stewart, found that the Court had
"misapplied" the principle of the Establishment Clause.370 Tracking the
319 See id. at 422-23.
3' Engel v. Vitale, 206 N.Y.S.2d 183 (N.Y. App. Div. 1960); Engel v. Vitale, 191 N.Y.S.2d
453 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959).
361 See Engel v. Vitale, 206 N.Y.S.2d 183 (N.Y. App. Div. 1960); Engel v. Vitale, 191
N.Y.S.2d 453 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959).
362 See Engel v. Vitale, 176 N.E.2d 176 (N.Y. 1961).
3' Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,424 (1962).
3" Id. at 425-37.
' See id. at 432.
3" Id. at 430.
367 See id. at 434.
3" Id. at 435.
369 Id.
370 See id. at 445 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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rationale of the New York Court of Appeals,"7' Justice Stewart referred to the
many references to God and religion by the government, including the
Declaration of Independence, the inauguration speeches of almost all
presidents of the United States, and the expression "In God We Trust," which
has been engraved on American coins since 1865.7 He argued that these acts
of government did not constitute an establishment of religion and that the
prayer at issue did not either. According to Justice Stewart, religion is not
established by simply "letting those who want to say a prayer say it." '373 He
added that "to deny the wish of these school children to join in reciting this
prayer is to deny them the opportunity of sharing in the spiritual heritage of
our Nation. 3
74
One year later in School District ofAbington Township v. Schempp,37 the
Court ruled on the constitutionality of two school prayer statutes, one from
Maryland and one from Pennsylvania. The Pennsylvania statute required that
"[a]t least ten verses from the Holy Bible shall be read, without comment, at
the opening of each public school on each school day,"376 and it permitted
pupils to be excused from this religious exercise upon the written request of
their parents.377 The Maryland statute, in contrast, did not prescribe the
reading of the Bible as mandatory but provided a legislative basis for the local
boards of education to adopt rules for religious opening exercises in public
schools. Mrs. Murray and her son371 challenged the adoption of such a rule for
religious opening exercises by the Board of Education of Baltimore City,
which required that each school day open with Bible reading.
379
17, See Engel v. Vitale, 176 N.E.2d 176 (N.Y. 1961).
371 See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 446-49 (1962).
371 Id. at 445.
374 Id.
371 School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
376 Id. at 205 (citations omitted).
" This exemption was not part of the statute when the plaintiffs originally challenged the
statute in Schempp v. School Dist. of Abington Township, 177 F.Supp. 398 (E.D. Pa. 1959).
While the appeal of this decision was pending at the Supreme Court, Pennsylvania added the
exemption. The Supreme Court thus vacated judgment and remanded the case to the district
court for further proceeding. The District Court found again for the plaintiffs in Schempp v.
School Dist. of Abington Township, 201 F.Supp. 815 (E.D. Pa. 1962), and the District, its
officials, and the superintendent appealed again to the Supreme Court. See School Dist. of
Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 206 n. 1 (1963); GRIFFITHS, supra note 356, at
14-15 (providing more details about the case history).
37 In the book written by William J. Murray, he asserts that he actually did not want to
challenge the prayer but that it was his mother who initiated the suit. See WILLIAM J. MURRAY,
LET Us PRAY 1-28 (1995).
379 See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 211.
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The Supreme Court found that these religious practices violated the
Establishment Clause."' Justice Clark, who delivered the majority opinion,
conceded that "religion has been closely identified with [our] history and
government 38' and is therefore "strongly imbedded in public and private
life. '382 But he also reaffirmed the need for strict protection of religious
freedom, which has as important a role in "public and private life" as religion
itself.38 3 Seeking to resolve this conflict, he declared that the government has
to be neutral toward religion3" and articulated a two-part test: "[T]o withstand
the strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative
purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion.
385
Applying this test to the statutes at issue, the Court concluded that, even
though the state had a secular legislative purpose, the principal purpose was
clearly a religious one.3 The fact that attendance was not mandatory and that
an excuse from the religious exercise was possible upon request was,
according to the Court, irrelevant. Unlike the Free Exercise Clause cases,
coercion was not required for an Establishment Clause violation.
3 7
As in Engel, Justice Stewart was the only dissenter. He refused to "assume
that the school boards so lack the qualities of inventiveness and good will" as
to achieve a system of religious exercises that would meet the constitutional
standard.3
88
It was not until 1985 that the Supreme Court in Wallace v. Jaffree38 9 again
heard arguments concerning the constitutionality of a religious exercise in
public schools at the beginning of each day.39 Jaffree, on behalf of his
380 See id. at 227.
381 Id. at 212.
182 Id. at 214.
383 Id. (stating that religion "has not been so identified with [the Nation's] history and
government that religious freedom is not likewise as strongly embedded in our public and
private life").
3 See id. at 215 (referring to an opinion by Judge Alphonso Taft about the ideal relationship
between government and religion).
385 See id. at 222 (internal citation omitted).
'" See id. at 224. The Court declared: "[T]he state's recognition of the pervading religious
character of the ceremony is evident from the rule's specific permission of the alternative use
of the Catholic Douay version as well as the recent amendment permitting nonattendance at the
exercise." Id.
317 See id. at 223.
38 Id. at 320.
389 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
-9o It is therefore not correct to say that the Court in this case decided the constitutionality of
a moment of silence statute. Only one of the three statutes that were originally challenged at the
trial court level established a moment of silence at the beginning of each school day. This
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children, challenged an Alabama statute that allowed public schools to begin
each school day with "a period of silence for meditation or voluntary
prayer."39' Probably because of the "remarkable conclusion" of the District
Court that the First Amendment of the United States Constitution would not
block Alabama from establishing a state religion,392 the Supreme Court
deemed it necessary to recall some basic principles of the freedoms protected
by the First Amendment and their applicability to the states.3 93
Applying the Lemon test,394 the Court held that the statute was invalid
because it clearly lacked any secular legislative purpose.395 The record showed
that the statute was "an effort to return voluntary prayer to the public
schools." 3 This clear evidence of the plainly religious purpose of the statute
made it unnecessary for the Court to rule on whether a statute that simply
provides a moment of silence, without any religious undertones, would be
permissible under the First Amendment. Justice Stevens, who wrote the
majority opinion, pointed out that the Court's holding did not prohibit students
from praying by themselves during the school day.3 97 Additionally, Justice
O'Connor39 s and Justice Powell3 "9 emphasized in their concurring opinions that
a statute allowing a moment of silence and that had no religiously motivated
purpose could be constitutional. It is therefore possible to conclude that a true
moment of silence law would be upheld by the Court.' °
statute, which was held to be constitutional by the trial court, was challenged neither in the Court
of Appeals nor in the Supreme Court. See id. at 40-48; see also NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note
13, § 17.5, at 1269-70.
J9 affree, 472 U.S. at 41.
"9 See Jaffree v. Board of Educ., 554 F.Supp. 1104, 1128-30 (S.D. Ala. 1983) (holding the
Alabama statute that allowed prayer in public schools to be constitutional because the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution would be inapplicable to the states.) This holding
was overturned by the Court of Appeals in Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d. 1526, 1535 (11 th Cir.
1983); see also NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 13, § 17.5, at 1269-70.
'93 See Jaffiree, 472 U.S. at 48-55. The Court stated that although the First Amendment was
originally "adopted to curtail the power of Congress" it became applicable to the states with the
enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 49. Thus, the state of Alabama was now bound
to grant and protect the freedoms of the First Amendment in the same manner as is the Congress
of the United States. See id. at 49.
'94 See id. at 55.
'" See Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 56.
39 Id. at 56. (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted).
197 See id. at 59.
'" See id. at 73-74.
39 See id. at 62.
4 See NOWAK& ROTUNDA, supra note 13, § 17.5, at 1270-71; TRIBE, supra note 5, § 14-5,
at 1186.
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A shared characteristic of the three cases analyzed above is that each
involved a prayer that occurred on a daily basis during the entirety of the
student's education. As a result, some school officials and religious groups
concluded that a prayer at one single occasion-namely the graduation
ceremony-would be deemed constitutional notwithstanding Engel and
Schempp. In 1992, however, the Supreme Court rejected this argument with
its ruling in Lee v. Weisman."' By a five-to-four vote, the Court held that a
school policy permitting prayers at a graduation was unconstitutional because
it violated the Establishment Clause. °2
Daniel Weisman, the father of a girl who attended a public high school in
Providence, Rhode Island, challenged the school's practice of having a prayer
at the graduation ceremonies in public middle and high schools. °3 According
to the local school board's policy, the school principal was required to invite
a member of the clergy to deliver an invocation and a benediction at the
graduation ceremony.' The clergy member was instructed by the principal
to proceed according to an official booklet containing guidelines on how the
prayer should be conducted. He was also instructed that the prayer had to be
non-sectarian.: 5 The District Court, applying the Lemon test,m found the
school's practice unconstitutional. The prayer, although non-sectarian, had a
religious character and thus had an impermissible advancing effect on
religion.: 7 The Supreme Court, by contrast, did not rely on Lemon, but instead
based its ruling on the fact that the government's involvement with the prayer
was so pervasive that it created "a state-sponsored and state directed religious
exercise in a public school" ' 8 and that the student's attendance at the
ceremony was in a "fair and real sense obligatory" so that participation in
a religious exercise was in effect coerced. The petitioners' argument that the
40, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
4o2 See id. at 599.
40 Id. at 580-86.
40 See id.
4 See id.; see also Thomas A. Schweitzer, The Progeny of Lee v. Weisman: Can Student-
Invited Prayer at Public School Graduations Still Be Constitutional?, 9 BYU J. PUB. L. 291,
292-93 (1995).
o See Weisman v. Lee, 728 F. Supp. 68, 71-75 (D.R.I. 1990).
"17 See id. at 71-72. According to the District Court, the school board's practice of including
prayers in a graduation ceremony, even if they were non-sectarian, created the impression of
governmental identification with the religious practice. See id. at 72. This effect would endorse
or even advance religion and thus violate the Establishment Clause. See id. at 73.
4 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. at 587.
09 Id. at 586.
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student's attendance at the ceremony was not mandatory was rejected by the
Court as being too formalistic. The Court stated:
Attendance may not be required by official decree, yet it is
apparent that a student is not free to absent herself from the
graduation exercise in any real sense of the term "voluntary,"
for absence would require forfeiture of those intangible
benefits which have motivated the student through youth and
all her high school years. 10
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia sought to place the issue of prayers
at graduation ceremonies in historical context.41' Referring to the fact that
even the framers of the Constitution had tolerated prayers at ceremonies of all
three branches of government, 42 he concluded that they would also have
tolerated prayers at graduation ceremonies. To support his position, Justice
Scalia referred to Marsh v. Chambers413 in which the Supreme Court had held
that prayers at the opening of legislative sessions were constitutional because
this practice was "[firom our Nation's origin .. .a prominent part of
governmental ceremonies and proclamations."" 4 The majority opinion did not
consider Marsh controlling precedent because of the differences that marked
legislative sessions and public school systems, particularly in light of the youth
and impressionability of students. Moreover, in the majority's view, a close
examination of the historical facts revealed that the framers most likely would
have opposed a graduation prayer at a public school.4"'
Because of the Court's narrow and fact-based holding,4"6 the decision in
Lee did not solve the question of whether any kind of prayer at high school
graduation ceremonies is unconstitutional. As a result, scholars today disagree
410 Id. at 595.
411 See id. at 631-32.
412 See id. at 633-35.
413 See id. at 632 (referring to Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983)).
414 Id. at 633.
411 See id. at 620-27 (Souter, J., concurring). For an analysis of the debate over the
hypothetical intent of the constitutional framers in this case, see generally Myron Schreck,
BalancingtheRight toPrayat Graduation andtheResponsibilityofDisestablishment, 68 TEMP.
L. REV. 1869, 1871 n.10 (1995); see also Michael Swomley, Myths about Voluntary School
Prayer, 35 WASHBURN L.J. 294, 294-95 (1996) (examining the intent of the fathers of the
Declaration of Independence).
416 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577,586 (1992) ("These dominant facts mark and control
the confines of our decision....").
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about the constitutionality of prayers at graduation ceremonies, 4 " and the body
of case law in the lower courts on this issue is inconsistent.48
In American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey v. Black Horse Pike
Regional Board of Education,1 9 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit confronted a school board policy that allowed students to decide
on (1) the way a graduation-prayer would be conducted, (2) the content of the
prayer if the class decided to have one, and (3) who should deliver the prayer.
In 1993, a referendum led to the following result: 128 students voted for a
prayer, 120 voted for a moment of silence, and 20 voted to have neither.42
The Third Circuit found that the school board's policy violated the Establish-
ment Clause because the freedom of religion protected by that clause could not
be determined by a majority vote. The court stated: "The First Amendment
does not allow the state to erect a policy that only respects religious views that
are popular because the largest majority cannot be licensed to impose its
religious preferences upon the smallest minority. '42 In addition, the Third
Circuit found that the policy allowing the students to vote was just a way to
elude the consequences of the Supreme Court's decision in Lee. Judge
McKee, who wrote the majority opinion, applied the same criteria used by the
Supreme Court in Lee and found that the state's control of the graduation
ceremony as well as the students' coerced participation was also present in this
case.4' Also applying the Lemon test, the court found that the sole purpose of
the policy was not to provide the students with more rights to free speech but
to avoid the certain unconstitutionality of prayers at graduation that were
ordered by school officials.42 Thus, the policy lacked a secular purpose. In
addition, the challenged policy had the effect of advancing religion and
411 See Schweitzer, supra note 413, at 291 nn.4-5 (referring to various articles in which the
authors had concluded that the Court in Lee had "outlawed any form of prayer at public school
graduations"). Professor Schweitzer himself believes that "graduation school prayer can be
constitutional under carefully controlled circumstances." Id. at 306.
418 See Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 505
U.S. 1215(1993); Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 851 F. Supp. 446 (M.D. Fla. 1994);
Ingebretsen v. Jackson Pub. Sch. Dist., 864 F. Supp. 1473, 1479, 1488 (S.D. Miss. 1994).
4'9 84 F.3d 1471 (3d Cir. 1996).
420 See id. at 1475.
421 Id. at 1488
422 See id. at 1478-83 (finding, among other things, that the delegation of this delicate aspect
of the graduation ceremony to the students neither released the school board from the duties set
forth in the Establishment Clause nor eliminated the presence of state control at the ceremony).
42' See id. at 1484-85.
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therefore violated the principle of government neutrality.424 Because the
policy neither passed the Lemon test nor the principles of endorsement or
coercion established in Lee, the Third Circuit concluded that the policy must
be unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.4 5
Jones v. Clear Creek Independent School District426 presented facts similar
to those in Black Horse Pike but produced a different result. As in Black
Horse Pike, the school board resolution allowed the senior class to decide on
whether it wanted to have a prayer and required that the prayer should be
delivered by a student volunteer.427 Viewing the Establishment Clause analysis
as a "delicate and fact sensitive one, 4 28 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit applied all five tests429 that the Supreme Court has used in its
Establishment Clause cases and found that under all five tests the resolution
was in line with the Establishment Clause. Using the Lemon test, the court
found a secular purpose in the school board's intent to solemnize the
graduation ceremony430 and held that the primary effect of the resolution was
not to advance religion but to solemnize the ceremony. In addition, the Fifth
Circuit found that there was no endorsement of religion by the school officials,
just as there was no endorsement when a public school allowed a Christian
club to meet on school property after class along with all other student
organizations.43" ' The Fifth Circuit found neither coercion nor an excessive
entanglement of the government in religious matters. Unlike the facts Lee, the
senior class decided whether to have a prayer. As to government entangle-
ment, the court stated: "[T]he resolution keeps Clear Creek free of all
involvement with religious institutions. '432 Finally, the Court found that there
was "less psychological pressure on the student than.., in Lee" because the
prayer was delivered by a fellow student and because the students had the right
to vote on that issue.433 Because the school board policy passed all five
possible Establishment Clause tests, the Court concluded that "a majority of
424 See id. at 1488 (finding that a policy that "seeks to accommodate the preferences of some
at the expense of others... crosses the required line of neutrality").
42' See id. at 1488.
426 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1215 (1993).
427 See id. at 965.
428 Id. at 966 n.8 (citing Lee v. Weisman and Lynch v. Donelly).
429 The court here split the Lemon test into three parts (secular purpose, primary effect, and
entanglement) and added the two criteria used in Lee v. Weisman (coercion and endorsement).
430 See Jones, 977 F.2d at 966.
4" See Board of Educ. of Westside Community Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 247-53
(1990).
432 Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963, 968 (5th Cir. 1992).
431 Id. at 971.
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students can do what the state acting on its own cannot do";43' that is, they
could conduct a religious exercise at an official public school event.
In June 2000, the Court handed down its decision in Santa Fe Independent
SchoolDistrict v. Doe.435 The Court granted certiorary on the limited question
of "[w]hether petitioner's policy permitting student-led, student-initiated
prayer at football games violate[d] the Establishment Clause.' 436 The majority
of the Court decided that it did. The School District Board of Santa Fe had
adopted a policy that allowed an election to decide whether there would be an
invocation over the public address system before each home football game
and, in case the majority voted for an invocation, an election was held to
determine which student would deliver the invocation. Further, the district
entered an order allowing only non-sectarian and non-proselytizing prayers.
437
Basing its argumentation mainly on the principles endorsed in Lee v.
Weisman, 43 Justice Stevens found that the "student election does nothing to
protect minority views but rather places the students who hold such views at'
the mercy of the majority. Because 'fundamental rights may not be submitted
to vote' . . . the District's elections are insufficient safeguards of diverse
student speech.'1 39 Simply because a non-sectarian prayer would "minimize[]
the intrusion on the audience," he concluded, the invocation would still be
offensive for some students and thus would violate their constitutional
rights.40 In addition, Justice Stevens argued that the district clearly had not
managed to separate itself completely from the "religious content" in the
student's speech. Instead, the opposite was true." The text of the policy and
the past practice indicated that the district clearly favored religious messages.
The court also rejected the district's argument that, unlike graduation
ceremonies, the attendance at high school football games was absolutely
voluntary. For some students, such as cheerleaders and football players, the
Court noted, attendance is mandatory and sometimes even a prerequisite for
class credit. Further, other students have social obligations that require their
presence at the football game.44' Thus, "[t]o assert that high school students
do not feel immense social pressure, or have a truly genuine desire, to be
434 Id. at 972.
43s 120 S. Ct. 2266 (2000).
4- Id. at 2275.
437 See id. at 2271.
438 505 U.S. 577 (1992)
4'9 Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 120 S. Ct. at 2276.
440 Id. at 2276-77.
44 See id. at 2277.
442 See id. at 2280.
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involved in extracurricular event that is American high school football is
'formalistic in the extreme.' ,"3
2. School Prayer in Germany. While in the United States the issue of
prayer in public school has long been disputed and remains unresolved today,
the Federal Constitutional Court in Germany resolved this issue in 1979 in a
clear and comprehensive manner.'4 In its decision, the Federal Constitutional
Court combined two lower court decisions, both of which dealt with the
constitutionality of a prayer held outside of religious instruction in compulsory
state schools. 45
The first case was brought by a father whose children attended a public
inter-denominational school in the state of Hesse. It was customary in this
school to start each school day with an inter-denominational prayer that was
recited by the children and their teachers. The Hesse Constitutional Court
found this practice to be constitutional unless a parent or pupil objected to it.'
Because the freedom of religion not only includes the freedom to believe and
to practice religion but also the freedom of not believing or not practicing
religion, pupils would be deprived of their religious freedom if they were
required to pray despite their beliefs.
The German Constitutional Court, however, reversed this decision. 47
According to the Court, the freedom of religion has two components, both of
which are equally protected and restricted: the freedom not to have any
religious belief and not to practice religion has the same scope of protection
as the freedom to believe and to practice religion."' The former freedom,
however, may not prevent the exercise of the latter freedom. In order to solve
this conflict, it is necessary to balance the competing freedoms and to find an
acceptable scope for each of them." 9 The Court found that it would be
possible for pupils who did not wish to pray to remain silent and not to
participate in the prayer or, alternatively, to leave the classroom to avoid any
encounter with religion. Even though theoretically there might be the danger
that such behavior could put a pupil in an outsider position, the Court did not
43 Id.
'4 See BVerfGE 52, 223. For a translation of this case, see KoMMERS, supra note 220, at
466-72.
44 See BVerfGE 52, 223 (224).
"' Entscheidung des Hessischen Staatsgerichtshofs [Constitutional Court of Hesse] [ESVGH]
16, 1 (1965).
447 See BVerfGE 52, 223 (235).
448 See id. at 251.
4See id. (stating that a balance between both conflicting rights must take into account the
basic principle of tolerance).
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consider this danger to be concrete enough to outweigh the rights of the pupils
who wished to pray. For this reason, the Federal Constitutional Court reversed
the judgment of the Hesse Constitutional Court and held that a prayer in inter-
denominational public schools is constitutional, even if the parents or a pupil
object to it, so long as the pupils are free control their own participation in the
prayer.
450
The second case that the Federal Constitutional Court decided in this
combined decision arose out of a complaint brought by a father whose
daughter objected to a prayer conducted at a public inter-denominational
school in Aachen. In responding to the claim, both the Administrative Court
of Aachen and the Court of Appeals ofNorth-Rhine/Westphalia prohibited the
prayer based on the "negative freedom of confession."'' The highest
administrative court of Germany, however, reversed the judgment on the
ground that the "negative freedom of confession" would not hinder a prayer
at an inter-denominational state school,452 and the Federal Constitutional Court
upheld this judgment.453 The Federal Constitutional Court emphasized that
article 7(3) of the Basic Law gave the state a broad right to establish different
types of schools, including inter-denominational schools.'5 ' Because a prayer
is not part of the official curriculum of these schools, the participation is
voluntary and not compulsory.4" By including the prayer as a part of the
regular school day, the state identifies itself with a certain religious belief.
Article 7 of the Basic Law, however, allows a connection between state and
church in the educational system to a certain degree. If the parents, students,
and teachers, therefore, wish to exercise their religious freedom by beginning
each school day with a prayer, they may do so."56 The "negative freedom of
confession" of objectors may not prevent the prayer unless the objectors have
to face an unbearable burden by being exposed to the prayer or will encounter
adverse consequences because of their non-participation. 57 A student may get
45 See id. at 223. The German original reads as follows: "Das Schulgebet ist grundsAtzlich
auch dann verfassungsrechtlich unbedenklich, wenn ein Schiler oder dessen Eltem der
Abhaltung des Gebets widersprechen; deren Grundrecht auf negative Bekenntnisfreiheit wird
nicht verletzt, wenn sie frei und ohne ZwAnge Ober die Teilnahme am Gebet entscheiden
k6nnen." Id.
451 Id. at 229-30.
452 BVerwGE 44, 196.
4S3 See BVerfGE 52, 223 (235).
44 See id. at 236 (referring to the former decisions: BVerfGE 41, 29; BVerfGE 41, 65; and
BVerfGE 41, 88).
4" See id. at 239.
4S See BVerfGE 52, 223 (240-41).
4S Id. at 249.
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into an outsider position because of his non-participation in the prayer. Unlike
the United States Supreme Court, the Federal Constitutional Court did not
consider discrimination against non-participating students very likely to occur
if the prayer were only held at the beginning of each school day.45 According
to the Court, in most cases it is sufficient that the teacher explains to the other
children the reason why the student does not want to pray and that his behavior
is not "strange." '459 Moreover, the court continued, the danger that a student
may become an outsider if he does not participate in the prayer is the same as
the consequences he encounters when he does not participate in the religious
instruction, and in the latter case the constitution specifically permits such
non-participation." ° It must also be taken into account that today, in many
classes the religious affiliation of the students is so diverse that non-participa-
tion in religious instruction and in the school-prayer is a common phenome-
non. Thus, it is very unlikely that only one student will be placed in an outsider
position where he has to face severe consequences." Nevertheless, the
Federal Constitutional Court recognized that there may be rare cases in which
the prayer may unduly burden a student-for example, if the student is
emotionally weak and the teacher is not able to successfully mediate between
the student and the class.462 In these rare cases, according to the Court, it is
necessary to prohibit the prayer in order to protect the "negative freedom of
religion" of the individual student." 3
C. Religious Symbols in Public Schools
1. Religious Symbols in Public Schools in the United States. The debate
over whether the display of religious symbols in public schools is constitu-
tional has not been dealt with as extensively as the issue of prayer in public
schools. This paper will limit its analysis to the only case the Supreme Court
has decided in this area-the 1980 decision in Stone v. Graham.4 In that case,
the Supreme Court invalidated a Kentucky statute that required the posting of
41' See id. at 249.
4S9 See id. at 251.
460 See id. at 252. The German original reads as follows: "Der nicht am Schulgebet
teilnehmende Schiler wird regelmBig auch den Religionsunterricht nicht besuchen. Hier setzt
das Grundgesetz in Art. 7 Abs. 2 ersichtlich voraus, da3 es... zu keiner Diskriminierung
kommt." Id.
46 See BVerfGE 52, 223 (252).
462 See id. at 253.
4 Id. at 253.
' Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
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a copy of the Ten Commandments on the wall of each public school class-
room. Contrary to the holdings of the trial court and the Supreme Court of
Kentucky, 5 a majority of the Supreme Court Justices found, in a per curiam
opinion, that the statute lacked a secular purpose' and thus violated the first
part of the Lemon test."7 The statute required that each copy of the Ten
Commandments had to bear the following explanatory notation: "The secular
application of the Ten Commandments is clearly seen in its adoption as the
fundamental legal code of Western Civilization and the Common Law of the
United States." This simple notification, however, was not enough proof for
a majority of the justices that the statute had a secular purpose. Referring to
School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, the Court concluded that
"[tihe pre-eminent purpose for posting the Ten Commandments on school-
room walls [was] plainly religious in nature" because "[tihe Ten Command-
ments are undeniably a sacred text in the Jewish and Christian faiths." 9 The
dissent, on the other hand, saw the legislative notification in another light.
While Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun would have given the case
plenary consideration,47 ° Justice Stewart dissented from the summary reversal
of the lower courts' decisions because he found that, according to the facts
presented to the Supreme Court, "the courts of Kentucky ... [had] applied
wholly correctly constitutional criteria in reaching their decision.""' In a
separate dissent, Justice Rehnquist pointed out that the Court had never before
rejected the legislature's clearly stated secular purpose in such a simple and
superficial manner.472 Referring to Schempp and other precedents, he pointed
out that the Court had always either accepted the stated secular legislative
intent or had questioned it in a more detailed manner.
7 3
2. Religious Symbols in Germany's Public Schools. In Germany, the
display of religious symbols in public schools has recently become a
controversial subject.474 The issue gained much attention in 1995 when the
463 See Stone v. Graham, 599 S.W.2d 157 (Ky. 1980).
4" See Stone, 449 U.S. at 41.
"7' See id. at 43.
4" Id. at 39 n.1.
4" Id. at41.
470 See id. at 43 (Burger, Ch. J. and Blackmun, J., concurring).
47' Id. at 43 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
47 See id. at 43 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
471 See id. at 43-47.
474 John E. Coons points out that very few decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court have
received so much media attention as the crucifix case. See John E. Coons, Of Crucifixes and
Community, in VERFASSUNGSSTAATLICHKEIT, FESTSCHRIFT FOR KLAUS STERN ZUM 65.
GEBURTSTAG 927,928 (Joachim Burmeister et al. eds., 1997); see also, e.g., Jargen Busche, Das
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Federal Constitutional Court invalidated a Bavarian law that required the
posting of a cross or crucifix on the wall of each public school classroom.47 '
On behalf of their three children, a married couple challenged this law, arguing
that the display of a cross (or, even more pointedly, a crucifix because of its
portrayal of a suffering man) would influence their children's perception of the
Christian faith and could lead to proselytizing. The plaintiffs filed their action
in the Administrative Court of Regensburg, seeking a preliminary injunction
that would force the school to remove cross from the classroom during the
pendency of the action. The administrative court, however, denied this
injunction for two reasons.""' First, it said that because the cross was only a
symbol on the wall and not part of the regular classes, it had no proselytizing
function. Second, the court emphasized that religion and education are not
strictly separated in Germany. The court reasoned in particular that because
it is constitutional for the state to establish inter-denominational schools,
4 77
which are not required to act With complete neutrality toward religion, these
schools may put up religious symbols in classrooms.47' Referring to the
principle of tolerance and the holding of the Federal Constitutional Court in
the school prayer case,479 the administrative court found that the plaintiffs'
right to remove the cross from the classroom, based on a "negative freedom
of confession," could not be superior to a "positive freedom of religion" of
other students who wanted the cross in the classroom.480
While the court of appeals affirmed the administrative court's decision,"'
the Federal Constitutional Court reversed the judgment by a five to three
margin.4s  The Court reasoned that in combination with compulsory
attendance in school, the display of a cross in the classroom violated the
Kruzifix-mehr als ein Wandschmuck, SODDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, Aug. 11, 1995, at 4; Hans
Holzhaider, Hefiige Reaktionen auf das Karlsruher Krizifix-Urteil, SODDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG,
Aug. 11, 1995, at 25; Axel von Campenhausen, Furcht vor Signalwirkung, FOCUS, Aug. 14,
1995, at 42-44.
471 See BVerfGE 93, 1.
476 See Verwaltungsgericht Regensburg [Administrative Court of Regensburg]
[VGRegensburg], in BayVBI 1991, 345.
4" See, e.g., BVerfGE 41,29 (examining the constitutionality of inter-denominational public
schools in Baden-Walrttemberg); BVerfGE 41, 65 (examining the same issue in Bavaria);
BVerfGE 41, 88 (examining the same issue in North-Rhine/Westphalia).
478 VGRegensburg, in BayVBI 1991, 345 (346).
479 See BVerfGE 52, 223.
410 See VGRegensburg, in BayVBI 1991, 345 (345-46).
' See Bayrischer Verwaltungsgerichtshof [Bavarian Higher Administrative
Court][BayVGH], in NEusTE VERWALTUNGSRECHTSZEITSCHRIFT [NVwZ] 1991, 1099.
412 See BVerfGE 93, 1 (13).
2000] 473
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
children's right of negative religious freedom; that is, the right to believe in
nothing."3 This right, according to the Court, outweighed the "negative
freedom of belief' of the children for a variety of reasons.4
First, the Court reasoned that the children were exposed to the cross for a
long and intense period because they must spend much of their day in the
classroom. While it is often possible to avoid confrontation with religious
symbols in day-to-day life, it is impossible for children to avoid confrontation
with a cross in a classroom." 5 Hence, the display of a cross in a classroom
rendered the "positive freedom of belief' superior to the "negative freedom of
belief' in a way that unduly burdened the plaintiffs' freedom of religion. 
4 6
Second, by enacting a statute that required the posting of a cross in every
school room, the state had overstepped the line of permissible accommodation
of religion in the school system set forth by article 7 of the Basic Law.487 Even
though inter-demoninational schools may refer to the Christian faith as a major
factor for the cultural and educational development of Germany, they may not
post Christian symbols for a merely proselytizing reason. The cross is
generally seen as a distinctive and representative sign of the Christian
religion,88 and the erection of a cross often represents a symbol of identifica-
tion with the Christian religion. Thus, the display of a cross in a classroom
will convey a message of the school's identification with the Christian
religion, which the Court found to constitute impermissible proselytizing.4 9
The three dissenting judges, on the other hand, found that while the cross
was a sign of the Christian religion it was also a symbol reflecting German
tradition. 490 According to the dissent, the display of a cross in a classroom was
not proselytizing but simply a reference to the Christian tradition of
Germany.49' Thus, according to the dissent, the law requiring the posting of
a cross in every classroom was constitutional.
483 See id. at 18.
4" See id. at 22-24.
481 See id. at 18 (distinguishing this situation from an earlier decision in which the Court had
held the display of a cross in the courtroom to be constitutional).
49 See id. at 24.
487 BVerfGE 93, 1 (16-17, 19).
41 See id. at 19. The German original reads as follows: "Das Kreuz geh6rt nach wie vor zu
den spezifischen Glaubenssymbolen des Christentums. Es ist geradezu sein Glaubenssymbol
schlechthin." Id.
489 See id. at 20 (arguing that the students would be more likely to follow the Christian belief
if the school identifies itself with the Christian faith).
490 See id. at 32.
491 See id. at 33. The German original reads as follows: "Die Schiller werden durch das
Kreuz auch nicht in verfassungsrechtlicher unzulassiger Weise missionarisch beinflui3t." Id.
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This decision of the Federal Constitutional Court invalidating the Bavarian
law led to a great deal of criticism. Many scholars and politicians accused the
Federal Constitutional Court of misinterpreting fundamental constitutional
principles by providing absolute protection to the "negative freedom of
religion" and thus rendering the "negative freedom of religion" superior to the
"positive freedom of religion. 492 Others expressed their fear that the Federal
Constitutional Court would abandon the fundamental church-state relationship
and emphasized that the Nazis, fifty-four years earlier, began their disestab-
lishment of the church-state relationship with the removal of crosses from all
public school rooms.493
Only four months after the Federal Constitutional Court rendered its
decision, the Bavarian government adopted a new law in order to keep the
crosses within the public schools.494 This new law also mandated the posting
of a cross on the classroom wall. Unlike the law that was invalidated by the
Federal Constitutional Court, it stated that if children or parents objected to the
cross, the cross must be removed. The constitutionality of this law was
challenged, but the Bavarian Constitutional Court and the Highest Administra-
tive Court of Germany upheld the law because of the option it gave to non-
believers to remove the symbol.495
The mandatory display of a cross in public schools in Germany, therefore,
is considered to be unconstitutional, unless there is a possibility for removal
in case students or parents object to the display.496 The result would be the
same for all other religious symbols having a proselytizing effect. Thus, a case
like Stone v. Graham4 97 would have had the same outcome in Germany. Just
as in the German crucifix case, the Kentucky state statute required the posting
4 J6rg Muller-Vollbehr, Positive und Negative Religionsfreiheit, JURISTISCHEZEITUNG 996,
999 (1995) [hereinafter JZ]; Peter Badura, Das Kreuz im Klassenzimmer, BAYVBL 71, 75
(1996); see also Axel von Campenhausen, Furcht vor Signalwirkung, Focus, Aug. 14, 1995,
at 42-44 (providing further references).
493 Heribert Prantl, Gottes Gericht. Die Kampagne gegen die Bundesverfassungsrichter,
SODDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, Aug. 19, 1995, at 24; Maria Schwarz, Chaos im Klassenzimmer,
Focus, Aug. 21, 1995, at 30.
49 GESETZ ZUR ANDERUNG DES BAYRISCHEN GESETZES OBER DAS ERZIEHUNGS- UND
UNTERRICHTSWESEN [Law Amending the Bavarian Educational Law] [BAYEUG] art. 7 III
(1995).
""' See Bayrischer Verfassungsgerichtshof [Bavarian Constitutional Court] [BayVerfGH], in
NJW 3157; BVerfGE 6 C 18.98.; see also Robert Probst, Das Kruzifix-Gesetz ist
verfassungskonform, SODDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, Apr. 22, 1999, at L-8.
491 The only exception from this general principle is the denominational public school, which
would allow every identification of the school with the religious belief. See Rux, supra note
228, at 533.
4" 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
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of religious symbols in public schools without granting an exemption to
parents or students who wished to remove them. Faced with such a case, the
Federal Constitutional Court would have invalidated the law on the same
grounds on which it invalidated the Bavarian law that required the posting of
the cross.498
Indeed, even the dissent in the German crucifix case would have joined in
the majority opinion. The dissent reasoned that the cross had played an
important role in historical and cultural developments .4" Thus, they argued,
that the display of a cross in the public school room was not proselytizing, but
only a reference to the important role the Christian faith had played in German
historical development.
In contrast, the Ten Commandments have not had a significant role in the
historical development of Germany. From a German point of view, the
posting of the Ten Commandments is considered to have an even more
proselytizing character than the posting of a cross. The cross is sometimes
seen as a sign of peace and blessing or as a sign of charity, as is the case with
the Red Cross.5" The Ten Commandments on the other hand do not have such
a perceived secular meaning. Consequently, a law requiring the mandatory
posting of the Ten Commandments without an exemption for cases in which
students or parents object to the display would be unconstitutional under the
German Basic Law. A voluntary unanimous decision by students, parents, and
school authorities to post the Ten Commandments, on the contrary, would be
constitutional in Germany, even though probably unacceptable in the United
States. The same would be true for all other religious symbols, even if they
arenot symbols of the Christian faith. According to the Federal Constitutional
Court, the public schools-regardless of whether they are non-denominational
or Christian inter-demoninational-have to be neutral toward other religious
beliefs in the sense that they tolerate these other religious beliefs.'O° Hence, if
most students in a class are Muslims, the school may post a picture of Mecca
on the classroom wall, so long as no one objects to it. 0 2
4n See Coons, supra note 474, at 931 (making the argument vice versa that the Supreme
Court would have decided the crucifix case the way they decided Stone v. Graham).
499 BVerfGE 93, 1, 32-33 (1995).
"o Christoph Link, Stat Crux?, in NJW 353, 3355 (1995).
501 See BVerfGE 41,29; see also KOMMERS, supra note 220, at 477 (providing a translation
of the German decision).
" See Wolfgang Huber, ChristlicheKirchen habe keinen Monopolanspruch, SODDEUTESCHE
ZEITUNG, Aug. 17, 1995. Huber suggests that in a public school in Berlin where most of the
students are Muslim a picture of Mecca should be placed next to the cross to show the school's
acceptance of both religions.
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D. FreeExercise Rights of Teachers in Public Schools
1. Free Exercise Rights of Teachers in United States Public Schools. The
government may impede the free exercise of religion by teachers primarily in
two ways."0 The first is by mandating what the teacher should or should not
teach. If a biology teacher's religion, for example, disfavors birth control in
general, a conflict with his religious belief will arise if he has to discuss the
different methods of birth control with his class. °" In such a situation,
however, the teacher certainly may not change the content of the curriculum
to accord with his religious beliefs. To give him such power over the
curriculum, "would make the teacher the ultimate arbiter" of the performance
of his duties and of what the children will learn. 5 Thus, his professional and
contractual duties clearly outweigh any personal religion based right to
determine the curriculum."l
There is, however, a second question: Can the teacher, while not seeking
to change the curriculum, seek to be excused from teaching certain material
that conflicts with personal religious mandates? This question is more difficult
to solve, and cases in this area are very complicated and fact-sensitive.
Nevertheless, the proper answer in the majority of cases will most likely be a
negative one. The essential principle, although subject to some limitations, is
that "[p]ublic employment cannot be predicated on the surrender of the
individual's constitutional rights."5 7 Following this principle, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a school teacher was
excused from participation in patriotic activities because of his religious
convictions.0 The court referred to decisions of the United States Supreme
Court, which in a related context had held that a teacher would not be
compelled to relinquish his First Amendment rights simply because of his
position as a public school employee.5" The Second Circuit, however, also
' For other situations in which a conflict between the free exercise right of the teacher and
the school may arise, see GRIFFTrHS, supra note 353, at 197-203.
'o See Howard 0. Hunter, Curriculum, Pedagogy, and the ConstitutionalRights of Teachers
in Secondary Schools, 25 WM. AND MARY L. REv. 1, 23 (1983).
s Id. at 58-59.
o See id. at 59; see also, e.g., Webster v. New Lenox Sch. Dist., 917 F.2d 1004 (7th Cir.
1990) (holding that a teacher's First Amendment rights were not violated when he was
prohibited from teaching a non-evolutionary theory of creation).
"o See Hunter, supra note 504, at 67 (citing Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209
(1977)).
" See Russo v. Central Sch. Dist. No. 1, 469 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1972).
'09 Id. at 631 (citing Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) and Pickering v.
Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968)).
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recognized the teacher's important function in the educational process of the
children and the school's interest in maintaining the flag salute program. °
The exercise of First Amendment rights by the teacher should not be likely to
"threaten the essential functions" of the school system.51 1 Thus, it is necessary
to balance the legitimate state interest in maintaining the flag salute program
against the First Amendment freedoms of the individual.5 12 In balancing these
interests, the court found that the school board had the right to enforce
regulations that were intended to secure the success of the flag salute program,
but that "such regulations must be narrowly drawn for precision of regulation
must be the touchstone in an area so closely touching our most precious
freedoms." ' 3  In this case, the Second Circuit found that the board of
education had failed to provide such narrow regulations and as a result had not
"met the test of constitutional exactness required by the First Amendment.,5t 4
The behavior of the teacher during the flag salute-she was standing in
respectful silence with her hands at her side--did not endanger the state's flag
salute program in any way.5t 5 As a result, her dismissal was unjustified and
violated her First Amendment rights.516 There is a serious question whether
the result in this case would change in light of the Supreme Court's decision
in Employment Division v. Smith." 7 It is quite possible, however, that the
Smith rule does not control this situation. Rather, as with Wisconsin v.
Yoder,"' the case may present a hybrid free exercise and free speech problem
that permits recognition of a religious exemption to a generally applicable rule.
The same arguments can be made for teachers who refuse to teach subjects
and theories that are contrary to their religious convictions. In these cases,
however, the students' right of education according to the curriculum set forth
by the state519 is a strong and legitimate governmental interest that may well
outweigh the teacher's First Amendment rights. If it is possible for the local
school board to replace the teacher for this particular subject, the importance
5 0 See Russo, 469 F.2d at 633.
s Id. at 63 1.
512 See id. at 632 (referring to the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Robel, 389
U.S. 258 (1967).
53 Id. at 632 (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted).
114 Id. at 633.
515 See id.
516 See id.
5" Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,875 (1990).
s 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
5 See Hunter, supra note 504, at 34 n.141 (stating that this right is based on the "right to
know" that was granted to the students in many court decisions).
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of the First Amendment rights would certainly require such an action. 20 On
the other hand, in some cases, it might be necessary for the teacher to continue
teaching subjects contrary to his religious beliefs if the governmental interest
outweighs his free exercise right. Because cases in this area are very fact
sensitive, it is not possible to provide one clear and comprehensive solution.
Instead, these cases must be decided on a case by case basis, balancing the
governmental interest in the furtherance of the education of the children
against the teacher's free exercise rights.
In addition, it is beyond doubt that a teacher may neither give religious
instruction nor incorporate religious statements into his regular lessons.5 2'
Because a teacher, in the eyes of the pupils, represents the school, a religious
statement would be seen as a religious statement of the government. The wall
of separation between church and state prohibits the identification of
government with a religious belief, and the principle of non-establishment
would supersede the teacher's free exercise right in these cases.
Another context in which conflicts between the free exercise right of the
teacher and the neutrality of the public school system toward religion may
arise concerns the wearing of religious garb. The Supreme Court of Oregon
reversed a decision of the Oregon Court of Appeals that had set aside the
revocation of the teaching certificate of a teacher who wore, in compliance
with religious dictates, white clothes and a white turban.5" The revocation of
the license was based on an Oregon statute that prohibited teachers from
wearing religious dresses "while engaged in the performance of duties as a
teacher" and also stated that the violation of this prohibition would lead to the
suspension and the revocation of the teacher's teaching certificate.5'2 The
Supreme Court of Oregon rejected the respondent's argument that the law was
unconstitutional under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.
Even though the Oregon statute was not religiously neutral but rather
discriminatory against certain religions that required a specific dress code, the
compelling government interest in securing the children's free exercise right
and the neutrality of the public schools toward religion was superior.' 24
Moreover, as the prohibition on wearing religious dress applied only during
the exercise of teaching functions, the Supreme Court of Oregon concluded
520 See id. at 69.
521 See GRIFFITHS, supra note 356, at 194-95 (referring to two lower court decisions which
prohibited the teacher from engaging in religious activities while performing his public-school
duties).
52 Cooper v. Eugene Sch. Dist. No. 4J, 723 P.2d. 298 (Or. 1986).
52, Id. at 300 (citation omitted).
524 See id. at 309-10.
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that the statute did "not impose an impermissible requirement for teaching in
the public schools." 525
A similar case was decided in 1990 by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit.52 6 Like Oregon, Pennsylvania had enacted a statute that
prohibited teaching in religious dress in public schools.527 Alima Delores
Reardon, a Muslim, was employed as a substitute teacher in the Philadelphia
school district. Beginning in 1984, she was told by the school principal that
she could not teach in her religious clothes. Upon her refusal to comply with
this requirement she was not allowed to teach. According to the Third Circuit,
the preservation of religious neutrality in public schools was a compelling
government interest thatjustified the enactment ofa religiously discriminatory
law.
528
2. The Free Exercise Right of Teachers in Public Schools in Germany.
Article 7(3) of the Basic Law provides for religious instruction in public
schools. Therefore, in contrast to the situation in the United States, a teacher
in Germany is allowed to provide religious instruction.129 This "positive" right
to teach religion logically corresponds with the "negative" right of refusal to
teach religious material. Although the right of the teacher to refrain from
religious teaching can be derived from the general right of religious freedom,
the Basic Law expressly states in article 7(3) that "[t]eachers may not be
obliged to give religious instruction against their will."53 Discrimination
against the teacher because of this refusal would thus be unconstitutional. It
is possible, however, to transfer the teacher who refuses to engage in religious
teaching to another school for administrative reasons.53'
The right to teach religion is limited to religion classes. Thus, outside of
religion classes a teacher may not offer religious instruction. He may for
cultural or historical reasons refer to certain religious beliefs, but he may not
advocate a certain religious belief or influence the pupil in a proselytizing
manner. 532 Freedom of religion also allows the teacher not to participate in any
religious activity, such as a school prayer.533
521 Id. at 311.
52 See United States v. Board of Educ. for the Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 911 F.2d 882 (3d
Cir. 1990).
'27 See id. at 885.
' See id. at 893.
529 See MAUNZ & DORIG,supra note 238, art. 7, at 33.
530 See GG art. 7(3).
53' See BVerwGE 17, 267 (1964).
532 See BVerfGE 41, 29.
5 See MAUNZ & DORUG, supra note 238, art. 7, at 43.
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Whether a teacher may wear religious garb while performing his official
school duties has already been decided for the Bhagwan sect, which wears a
red dress and a necklace with the picture of Baghwan Shree Rajnesh, the so-
called Mala.5 4 In 1986 the court of appeals in Munich and Hamburg held that
the wearing of such a dress in a public school was unconstitutional.5"
According to the courts, the teacher's free exercise right is limited when he is
performing his duties as an elementary public school teacher. Public schools
have to be neutral towards all religions, and teachers are not allowed to
proselytize their pupils. The teacher, as a representative of the school, must
also act neutrally toward all religions. This was found to be especially true for
elementary public schools because very young pupils frequently tend to look
to their teachers as examples and try to imitate them. 36 The courts found that
the guiding principles of the Bhagwan sect itself stated that the dress was not
only worn for religious reasons but also in order to attract people toward the
sect and to proselytize them.537 Moreover, the Bhagwan sect did not mandate
the wearing of the dress but made it voluntary. The main purpose for wearing
the Bhagwan dress is that its simplicity creates less distraction for the
followers and thus makes it easier for them to meditate."' The courts reasoned
that in the classroom a public school teacher has to teach and not meditate, and
thus, there is no need for him to wear the dress while teaching. 39 These
decisions were affirmed by the Highest Administrative Court two years later
in 1988, but the court added that the decision whether a teacher should be
allowed to wear religious dress depended mainly on the particular facts,
especially the nature of the dress and the impression the dress created on
outsiders.'
Because a uniform and comprehensive solution for this problem is not
possible the question of the constitutionality of a teacher's religious garb
remains the subject of much dispute. In Wuppertal, for instance, a Muslim
deputy-mistress of a public school was allowed to wear her religious garb at
" Oberverwaltunggericht Hamburg [Court of Appeals of Hamburg] [OVG Hamburg], in
NEUSTE VERWALTUNGRECHTSZEITUNG [NVwZ] 406 (1986); Verwaltungsgerichtshof Milnchen
[Court of Appeals of Munich] [VGH Mflnchen], in NVwZ 405 (1986); BVerwG, in NVWZ 937
(1988).S31 See OVG Hamburg, in NVwZ 406 (1986); VGH Mtinchen, in NVwZ 405 (1986).
536 See Rux, supra note 228, at 533 (referring to the two court decisions).
137 VGH Manchen, in NVwZ 405 (1986); OVG Hamburg, in NVwZ 406 (1986).
... See VGH Malnchen, in NVwz 405 (1986); OVG Hamburg, in NVwZ 406 (1986).
"9 See OVG Hamburg, in NVwZ 406, 407 (1986); VGH Mtlnchen, in NVwZ 405, 406
(1986).
50 See BVerwG, in NVwZ 938 (1988).
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school, whereas in the same school district but in another public school, the
school principle prohibited a Muslin teacher from wearing her scarf at
school." In order to decide the constitutionality of wearing religious garb, the
courts have to balance the free exercise rights of the teacher against the
requirement of neutrality of the public school by taking into account the
specific facts of the case.5'2 A court must take into account whether the
guiding principles of the teacher's religion dictates the wearing of the religious
garb as part of the religious exercise or if the wearing of the garb is only
voluntarily, as, for example, the wearing of a cross is for most Christians or the
wearing of a red dress and the Mala for the followers of Bhagwan. In addition,
the courts have to evaluate if the wearing of this religious dress by the teacher
has a proselytizing effect on the pupil.543 The Bhagwan dress, for example, is
considered to be much more proselytizing than the wearing of a Muslim
scarf.'"
In 1998, the denial of employment to a Muslim elementary teacher who
refused to teach without her scarf gained much attention. 5 The government
of Baden-WUrttemberg based its decision on the conclusion that the freedom
of religion of the children would supersede the freedom of religion of the
teacher.' The teacher, Fereshta Ludin, has now filed an action in the
Administrative Court of Stuttgart but no decision has been rendered. Because
this area is very fact-sensitive and the courts have to balance the constitutional
rights at issue on a case by case basis, it is very difficult to predict the outcome
of this case. In its decision the court will need to consider, for example, how
long and how extensively the children are exposed to the religious garb, if
Fereshta Ludin is wearing the religious garb solely for religious reasons, and
how she might explain the reasons for her appearance to the children.
As in the United States, the German cases that deal with whether a teacher
is allowed to wear religious garb are fact-sensitive and often difficult. The
courts need to take into account the teacher's free exercise right, the free
exercise rights of the students, and the principle of neutrality that requires the
public schools to "remain open to ... ideological and religious ideas and
"1 See Hartmut Kirstenfeger, Angst vor dem Kopfluch, Focus, Aug. 4, 1997, at 49.
542 See Rux, supra note 228.
5" See Kirstenfeger, supra note 541, at 49.
'" Seeid. at 85.
'4' See Alfred Behr, Muslimin beschaftigt den StuttgarterLandtag, SODDEUTsC-E ZEITruNG,
July 11, 1998, at 4; Wulf Reimer, Stuttgarter Toleranz-Edikt, SODDEuTScHE ZEITuNG, July 14,
1998, at 4.
See Reimer, supra note 545, at 4.
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values, 5 47 and to not proselytize the pupil. Because the operation of these
factors differs from case to case, a general principle has never been established
as to whether the wearing of a religious garb by a public school teacher is
constitutional.
V. CONCLUSION
Even though there is a fundamental difference in the relationship between
church and state in Germany and the United States, the treatment of religion
in public schools is in many ways similar. Both the United States and
Germany do not permit public schools to proselytize students. They also
prohibit public schools from identifying themselves with a certain religious
belief, which would cause them to lose their neutrality.548 Hence, the German
crucifix case and Stone v. Graham reached a similar outcome insofar as they
both prohibited the display of a religious symbol if the display created the
impression that the public school identified itself with a particular religion.
The main difference between the two decisions was that the United States
Supreme Court held that such an identification of the school with a certain
religion would create an impermissible establishment of religion, whereas the
German Federal Constitutional Court considered the mandatory display of the
cross to violate the general principle of governmental neutrality. The German
principle of religious neutrality is in some aspects broader and in some aspects
more narrow than the American non-establishment principle. Unlike the
American non-establishment principle, the German neutrality concept
embraces not only neutrality towards any religious belief but also neutrality
towards any ideological belief. It is therefore broader in its application than
the American principle. On the other hand, the principle of neutrality does not
hinder the government's ability to favor or accommodate religion, unless the
government favors a particular religion. The German government may, for
instance, favor religion by providing subsidies to religious communities, 9
whereas such government subsidies to religious organizations would be an
impermissible violation of the American non-establishment principle. As a
'4' KOMMERS, supra note 220, at 477 (citing a decision of the Federal Constitutional Court).
48 The only exemption to this principle of public school neutrality toward religion is the
German denominational public school. Today, however, this type of school is very rare in
Germany. Most of the German Lander have replaced such schools with inter-demoninational
or non-denominational public schools, which must be neutral toward religion.
'49 See GG art. 140; WRV art. 138; see also MAUNZ & DRIG, supra note 238, art. 10, at 64-
65 (providing more detail about the possibility of subsidies and financial contributions to the
religious communities).
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consequence, the German neutrality concept allows a certain degree of
accommodation of religious activities in public schools that is impermissible
in the United States.
The use of voluntary school prayer and the giving of religious instruction
on a voluntary basis are examples of the types of religious accommodation in
public schools that are common in Germany but unconstitutional in the United
States. However, the German principle of neutrality toward religion also puts
some restraints on the government. Under no circumstances are school
authorities or teachers allowed to proselytize students. Thus, as we have seen,
a statute that requires each public school classroom to have a cross on the wall
is considered to have an impermissible proselytizing effect on children. Such
religious exercise is therefore unconstitutional not only in the United States but
also in Germany.
The main reason for the different relationship between church and state in
the two countries can be seen in the historical development of each country.
Many of the citizens of colonial America had left their native countries
because of religious persecution. Nevertheless, many of these colonists
favored the establishment of an official religion." ° Religion played an
important part in the civil and political life of the colonists and, by the time of
the American revolution, ten of the thirteen colonies had established official
churches." 1 As Alexis de Tocqueville observed in 1830, religion also played
a major role in school education because every child was "taught the doctrines
and the evidences of his religion, the history of his country, and the leading
features of its constitution.,
552
By the end of the Civil War, however, it became clear that the diversity of
religious beliefs in the United States would make a close connection between
church and state almost impossible, and by the beginning of the 20th century
the need for independence of church and state was widely recognized all over
the United States. 553 As a result, the "wall of separation" approach-which
sso See CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICAN HISTORY xv (John F. Wilson & Donald L.
Drakeman eds., 2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter CHURCH AND STATE] (pointing out that even though
many of the colonists officially were against the establishment of religion, they nevertheless took
certain types of establishment for granted).
' See Stephen B. Epstein, Rethinking the Constitutionality of Ceremonial Deism, 96
COLUM. L. REv. 2083, 2099 (1996) (providing an excellent historical overview of the role of
religion in early American history).
552 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 198 (1954).
553 See CHURCH AND STATE, supra note 550, at 121-22, 161-62.
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was expressly embraced by the Supreme Court in Everson v. Board of
Education-has commanded much support for more than fifty years.5 4
In Germany, on the other hand, the relationship between church and state
developed in a different way. As in the United States, religious toleration was
not a common feature in the historical development of Germany. The citizens
of German states frequently had to follow the religious belief of their
sovereigns. Moreover, religious toleration and the separation of church and
state did not take hold in Germany until the enactment of the Weimar
Constitution in 1919. Unlike the United States Constitution, the Weimar
Constitution did not mandate a total separation of church and state but
connected the two institutions in a unique way. Even though the head of state
was no longer a dignitary of the church, the church retained some privileges
and the state could exercise supervision over some clerical matters. The
German relationship between church and state under the Weimar Constitution
could best be described as a system of cooperation, and religion remained a
part of the public school life in the forms of religious instruction and daily
prayer.555
At the beginning of the National Socialism era, in 1933, Hitler proclaimed
his affiliation with the Christian faith and promised to "establish a German
Reich built on a Christian basis and supported by ethical and moral force.
5 56
Especially in the educational sector, Hitler stated that he would "allow and
secure to the Christian Confessions the influence which is their due in both the
school and in education." '557 These statements led both main churches, the
Lutheran-Protestant church and Roman Catholic church, initially to welcome
and support "the advent of the Third Reich." ' Very soon after the Nazis'
seizure of power, however, both churches came to realize that Hitler did not
intend to favor the Protestant or the Roman Catholic church but rather intended
to establish a new kind of Christian religion tied to the Nazi regime. 59 The
only purpose of this type of Christian religion was to provide spiritual support
"4 However, it is sometimes argued that the framers of the Constitution did not intend this
separation to be as strict as it is seen today. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 53-66
(Rutledge, J., dissenting); CHURCH AND STATE, supra note 550, at 3-47; MURRAY, supra note
378, at 53-81 (providing a historical analysis of the framers' intent in the Establishment Clause).
sss See ERNST CHRISTIAN HELMREICH, RELIGIOUS EDUCATION IN GERMAN SCHOOLS 53-79
(1959).
556 FREDERIC SPOTTS, THE CHURCHES AND PoLmcs IN GERMANY 27 (1973).
117 Id. at 154.
s8 Id. at 7, 27.
'" See id. at 7 (stating that with Hitler's assistance it was possible "to establish a Nazified
'German Evangelical Church' with a National Socialist, Ludwig Mflller, as Reich bishop").
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for National Socialism. Under the pretense of freeing the state from harmful
church interference, the Nazis started to diminish the role of the churches and
of religion in public life.s" In all public buildings, such as courtrooms and
government offices, crosses were replaced by swasticas. This separation
between church and state in favor of an incorporation of the National Socialist
principles into public life became most obvious in Hitler's reorganization of
the school system. 6' The practice of daily school prayer was replaced by the
Nazi salute and a meditation on a word of the Ffihrer. The number of religious
holidays was cut down, the result being that Reformation Day, All Souls' Day,
and Corpus Christi Day were no longer recognized as national holidays. Both
the curriculum of religious instruction and the teachers who offered that
religious instruction were determined by the government. 62 Thus, the
government and not religious organizations chose the teacher who was not a
clergy member but a National Socialist able to teach religion in a way that
reconciled it with the Nazi ideology. "Surely there were many instructors
now.., who taught anything but religion in their classes, and these teachers
often used Bible stories as a basis for government propaganda."5 63 The
curriculum was also modified, with the result that the hours of class for
religious instruction were reduced and religion classes were taught "during the
first or last period of the morning," which made it more convenient for
students who did not take religion to be excused from these classes.'
By the time the churches realized that the ideas and goals of the Nazis, such
as the goals reflected in euthanasia and sterilization programs, were contrary
to fundamental religious principles, they had already lost too much of their
influence in public life. 6 Thus it was impossible for them to stop the Nazis.
Nevertheless, many clergy members of both churches openly criticized the
National Socialists and their ideology as violating fundamental religious
principles. For their criticism many of them faced severe punishment and
persecution by the Nazis. "Altogether during the Third Reich 3,000 pastors
were arrested, at least 125 were sent to concentration camps, and 22 are known
to have been executed for their beliefs."5
'o See von Campenhausen, supra note 245, at 388-89.
" See HELMREICH, supra note 555, at 153, 162-207 (providing detailed information about
the reorganization of the school system in the Third Reich).
56 See id. at 162-209 (providing a very good overview of the role of religion in public
schools under National Socialist rule).
s" Id. at 185.
Id. at 172.
s" See SPOTTS, supra note 556, at 27.
" Id. at 9.
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Although the churches lost a lot of influence during the National Socialist
period, they regained their power in the aftermath of the war and the
occupation era. As one of the few institutions left in Germany after the war,
the churches had to organize not only the religious but also the political and
social life in Germany. Frederic Spotts notes:
In the absence of organized political parties, the churches
were simply the only bodies in a position to address a com-
munication to an Allied authority and to maintain contacts
outside Germany. In towns and villages the pastor, priest, or
both became the social focal point, the person to whom most
people turned for advice, assistance, and leadership. In the
chaos following the collapse, churchmen became civil
authorities of great popular influence .... Until a German
government was reestablished in 1949, the churches consti-
tuted the most powerful and articulate voice of the German
people. 56
7
Because of the influence the two main churches had at the time of the
framing of the Basic Law, they were successful in insisting on constitutional
protections for their role in German public life. While some of the political
parties wanted a broad and comprehensive constitutional protection of the
churches, other political parties opposed a constitutional regulation of the
church-state relationship because of the complexity and difficulty such a
regulation would necessarily create."' After long discussions in parliament, a
compromise was reached by incorporating into the Basic Law those articles of
the Weimar Constitution dealing with the relationship between church and
state. In addition, the right of religious instruction was recognized in the Basic
Law because of the negative experiences under the National Socialist regime.
The modem day treatment of religion in public life in Germany and in the
United States, especially in public schools, is mainly based on the history of
the struggle between church and state in both countries. The negative
experience of religious persecution led the United States to embody a strict
separation of church and state in the Constitution, whereas Germany tried to
provide compensation for the negative influence of the Nazi regime on religion
by providing for a "special" church-state relationship in the Basic Law.
567 Id. at 51 (providing additional information about the role of the churches in the aftermath
of the war and the occupation era).
5" See von Campenhausen, supra note 245, at 391.
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Unlike the United States, where many believers had experienced religious
persecution by other religious groups, in Germany during the Third Reich
believers were persecuted by non-believers because their religious belief
endangered the state's ideology of National Socialism. While in the United
States religious persecution occurred because the government was connected
to religion, religious persecution in Germany occurred under a government
that had separated itself completely from religion. Both countries compen-
sated for that failure of religious protection. The United States did so by
separating church and state, and Germany did so by providing a closer
connection between church and state than was provided for under National
Socialism.
Another cause for the differing treatment of religion in public life in
Germany and in the United States is the variety and structure of religious
organizations in both countries. Due to historical developments, the people of
the United States are faced with a variety of religious beliefs and religious
organizations.569 Aside from the three main confessions, Protestantism,
Judaism, and Roman Catholicism, there are many other religious groups, such
as Mormons, Hindus, and Muslims.57° The sort of connection between church
and state that exists in Germany would be almost impossible to achieve in such
circumstances. In particular, a "cooperative" approach could lead to much
confusion and administrative effort as government sought to ensure equal
government treatment for all denominations. If, for instance, a country with
such a variety of religious beliefs as the United States adopted the German
"cooperative" approach, it would need many more government employees than
the German government currently has in order to ensure the fair and equal
treatment of all religious beliefs by the government. Thus, the administrative
costs for a cooperative relationship between church and state would be very
high in a country with a variety of diverse religious beliefs. In order to ensure
the equal accommodation of the different religions, religious instruction would
have to be provided in almost every religious belief; as a result, the govern-
ment would have to employ teachers for all these different religion classes.
The German connection between church and state can only function
properly in a country where religious beliefs are not as diverse as it is in the
$69 See MURRAY, supra note 378, at 139 (stating that there are over seven hundred
nonconventional religious denominations).570 See CHURCH AND STATE, supra note 550, at xviii; see also PHILIPM. PARKER, RELIGIOUS
CULTURES OF THE WORLD, A STATISTICAL REFERENCE 12-20 (1997) (providing a listing of
diverse religious groups and their appearance in the different countries of the world); J. GORDON
MELTON, ENCLYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN RELIGIONS 15-18 (5th ed. 1996) (providing an
overview of the different kinds of religions and religious beliefs in the United States).
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United States. In Germany most of the people are either Protestant or Roman
Catholic.57' Apart from these two major churches, very few other religious
groups in Germany have enough members to exercise political influence. It
is therefore much easier for the German government to ensure equal treatment
of all religious organizations than it would be for the United States government
to do this. The reality of religious diversity, however, has slowly begun to
surface in Germany in the last couple of decades. People from all over the
world come to Germany seeking asylum, and, because they are not predomi-
nately Protestant or Catholic, the religious diversity in Germany has greatly
increased over the past twenty years. Hence, the issue of whether Scientology
should be accepted as a religious organization and the question of whether the
state should provide religious instruction for Muslim school children by a
Muslim teacher according to Muslim guidelines, are both hotly debated issues
in Germany today.572 It may be only a question of time before Germany needs
to separate the church from the state in a more rigid way in order to ensure
equal treatment of all religious beliefs by the state.
While theoretical distinctions exists between the two countries, in reality
the countries do not differ as much in their treatment of religion. In fact, some
public schools in the United States still have the Ten Commandments posted
on the classroom wall or have prayers at graduation ceremonies because no
one objects to these practices or files a constitutional claim against the local
school board to seek a prohibition. Moreover, "[o]pinion polls show that a
majority of American citizens believe that their children should have the right
to pray in school."5" Other schools, however, have come to the conclusion
that any form of religious expression is forbidden in public schools. This has
led to the enactment of strict school policies prohibiting, for example, students
from singing religious songs in school or from gathering by themselves for a
voluntary prayer.5 74 In order to clarify between permitted and prohibited
religious acts in public schools, guidelines were suggested by President
Clinton, the American Civil Liberties Union, and many other public policy
" See HELMREICH, supra note 555, at 228-29 (providing a table about religious affiliation
in Germany in 1951); SPOTTS, supra note 556, at 221 (providing a table about vocational and
confessional distribution in Germany in 1961).
5 See Dieter Schmidtchen, Markt und Wettbewerb in Gottes Welt, FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, Nov. 1, 1997, at 17 (discussing the Scientology problem); Peter Schiltt,
Wie verfassungstreu sind Muslime in Deutschland?, FRANKFURTERALLGEMEINEZEITUNG, Apr.
19, 1995, at 10 (discussing the problem of Muslim religious instruction and the question of who
should organize the curriculum).
171 MURRAY, supra note 378, at xvii.
'74 See id. at 133-40 (citing additional examples).
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groups.575 These guidelines, however, are not binding and only suggest how
the school boards, principals, and teachers should handle certain religious
issues that arise in public schools. Thus, the treatment of religion in public
schools still differs from school district to school district.
76
Which one of the two countries provides a better approach to protect
religious freedom in public schools? Both countries have established a public
school system that tries to give maximum protection to the student's freedom
of religion. The teacher's freedom of religion can be limited in order to protect
both the student's religious freedom and the state's interest in public school
education. With respect to the protection of free exercise rights of public
school teachers, both countries therefore provide a similar protection: both
countries require their teachers to teach in a neutral way without
proselytizing. 7 The right of the teacher to refrain from teaching secular
subjects that conflict with his religious beliefs and his right to wear a religious
garb in class are decided on a case by case basis in both countries.
On the other hand, the two countries differ greatly concerning the issue of
possible accommodation of religion in public schools. While Germany allows
accommodation of religion to a certain degree, the Establishment Clause of the
United States Constitution mainly hinders such accommodation of religion in
public schools. In Germany it is, under certain circumstances, 578 possible to
have a school prayer and a cross in the classroom whereas in the United States
such practices would be a violation of the Establishment Clause. Hence, in
this particular area, the approach of the United States seems to provide a
clearer and more reliable protection of religious freedom in public schools than
does the German system. Because the German system allows the accommoda-
tion of religion in public schools to a certain degree, German courts very often
have to draw the line between permissible accommodation and impermissible
violation of the principle of neutrality toward religion. As we have seen in the
crucifix case, the outcome in these cases often depends on only a few criteria,
" See LA MORTE, supra note 317, at 67 (providing an overview of the content of these
guidelines).
576 A very popular example for this different treatment of religion can also be seen in the
hotly debated school voucher programs that some states provide for their citizens. See, e.g.,
Debbie Kaminer & Harlan Loeb, God, Money, and School: Voucher Programs Impugn the
Separation of Chuch and State, 30 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 1 (1996); Suzanne Bauknight, The
Search for Constitutional School Choice, 27 J.L. & EDUC. 525 (1998).
5" In Germany, the only time a teacher may proselytize is during religion classes.
5 The posting of a cross and the school prayer are only constitutional if they do not unduly
infringe on the religious rights of the objecting students. Therefore, it must be provided that in
case of objection the cross must be removed and that the student does not have to participate in
the prayer.
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and a minimal factual change may lead to a different outcome. The Federal
Constitutional Court invalidated a Bavarian law because it mandated the
display of a cross in each public school classroom, without any exemptions.
Four years later the Highest Administrative Court of Germany upheld a new
Bavarian law that also mandated the display of a cross but, unlike the old law,
provided an exemption from the mandatory display. In the United States, even
this small change would not have changed the outcome; the law requiring the
posting of a cross would still have been held unconstitutional. 79
But does the United States system really provide a clearer and more reliable
approach? If we consider this question only from a legal point of view,
perhaps. However, as already stated above, the reality in the United States is
different. As the present-day debate about school voucher programs shows,
there is actually a lot of uncertainty about how far religious accommodation
in school education is possible. 80 Religious symbols, like the Ten Command-
ments, although unconstitutional, can be found in public school rooms whereas
in other schools it is prohibited for students to gather voluntarily for prayer.
Of course, in Germany, as well, the reality differs from the legal point of view.
For example, children who do not want to participate in religious instruction
are not so easily excused from that subject if there is no alternative class, like
ethics, offered for them. If there is no obligation for the student to participate
in an alternative class, many students will ask to be excused from religious
instruction simply to have fewer classes and more leisure time.
In both countries the legal treatment of religion in public schools differs
from the actual relationship between religion and public schools. As long as
no one openly objects or files an action against a certain religious practice, the
school boards and school officials determine the actual role of religion in
public schools. Nevertheless, by providing the right to challenge governmen-
tal actions in court, both countries have given more protection to the freedom
of religion than many other countries, such as China or Iraq, where religious
persecution is still not unusual.581 By giving the individual the right to
judicially challenge governmental acts, both countries clearly do not state
"empty" principles in their constitutions but grant enforceable rights to their
citizens, making both countries modern constitutional states. Even if the
judicial protection may not be a perfect one because of the difficulties
concerning constitutional litigation in both countries, if somebody is willing
to challenge a religious practice in public schools, he will be able to do so.
579 See Coons, supra note 474, at 931.
380 See, e.g., Kaniner & Loeb, supra note 576, at 1; Bauknight, supra note 576, at 525.
.8! See Peter Gruber, Religionsfreiheit, Focus, Dec. 15, 1998, at 246-49.
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Thus, as long as the courts remain independent from church interference, both
states provide a meaningful protection of the freedom of religion in public
schools.
